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MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT: THE TRIAL OF
COMMON SENSE
Frank S. Alexandert
[T]he triumph of common sense over professional prejudices has
never been more strikingly illustrated, than in the gradual manner, in which Courts of Equity have been enabled to withdraw
mortgages from the stern and unrelenting character of conditions
at the Common Law.
Joseph Story1
For those of us with ample debts, the possibility of paying off a
home mortgage ahead of schedule may seem remote. If we decide
to sell the property or refinance the mortgage and thereby retire
some or all of our indebtedness, we might think that the lender will
be as happy to receive our money as we are to pay it. Such is not
necessarily the case, however. The lender might well refuse an offer
to pay the outstanding principal with accrued interest and insist that
final payment await the appointed day. Indeed, courts have allowed
lenders to reject a debtor's offer to prepay the principal, the accrued
interest to date, and interest which would accrue over the original
remaining term of indebtedness.
Even though borrowers do not normally anticipate paying off a
home mortgage prior to the dates set forth in the monthly amortization schedules, a borrower's ability to retire mortgage indebtedness
ahead of time is likely to become a major issue in the coming years.
In a period of relatively stable interest rates most lenders will allow
borrowers to pay off their home mortgages early. When interest
rates on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages fluctuate dramatically,
however, both lenders and borrowers become concerned with the
possibility of early debt retirement. Borrowers do not want to be
locked into high interest rates when rates are declining. Similarly,
lenders want to maximize the yield on their investments. The majority of residents in this country will want to pay off a mortgage
t
Associate Professor of Law, Emory University. B.A. 1973, University of North
Carolina; J.D. 1978, M.T.S. 1978, Harvard University. Of Counsel, Kutak, Rock &
Campbell, Atlanta, Georgia. I am deeply appreciative of the valuable guidance and criticisms concerning early drafts of this article provided by my colleagues at Emory Law
School and by Professors Alan Axelrod, Curtis Berger, Sheldon Kurtz, Grant Nelson,
Edward Rabin, and Dale Whitman. Any errors contained herein are, of course, my sole
responsibility.
I
2J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 281-82 (2d ed. 1839).
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prematurely in the coming decades. The economic significance of
the right to prepay is highlighted by the fact that over sixty-three
percent of American families own rather than rent their living
units, 2 with total residential mortgage indebtedness exceeding $1.8
trillion in 1985.3
Since the early nineteenth century the law has been clear: absent express contractual language to the contrary, a borrower has
no unilateral right to retire mortgage indebtedness prior to the date
specified in the underlying promissory note. 4 A lender may insist on
a surcharge, or premium, as consideration for accepting the borrower's early payment of the debt. Such prepayment charges in residential mortgages have been incorporated as standard clauses for
over fifty years. 5
Litigation and legislation in residential finance over the past ten
6
years have focused on the enforceability of "due-on-sale" clauses.
Such clauses usually permit lenders the option to demand payment
of the entire indebtedness upon sale or transfer of the mortgaged
property. In the near future the focus will shift to the prepayment
clause and the borrower's right to retire the debt prior to maturity.
Two recent factors, the emergence of the private secondary mortgage market and mortgage-backed securities 7 and federal preemption of state residential finance law, 8 will create pressure for the
development of prepayment charges as increasingly significant elements in residential mortgage transactions.
For the past one hundred and fifty years legal scholarship has
assumed that a borrower's inability to prepay mortgage indebtedness without the lender's consent was a principle embedded in the
common law since its early beginnings. A reexamination of the
leading cases and commentaries, however, reveals that this assumption is unjustified. To the contrary, this principle first emerged as a
rule of law in the nineteenth century, when major shifts in the economic aspects of residential finance provided the impetus for transformation of the common law of prepayment. 9 Similarly, major
economic shifts in the latter part of this century will lead to further
transformation in the law. From both viewpoints, the power of economic considerations to shape American law is evident.
2

BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S.:

ed. 1985).
3
Id. at table 843.
4
See infra notes 13-18 & 155-59 and accompanying text.
5

See infra notes 188-93 and accompanying text.

6
7

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

8
9

223-37 and accompanying text.
199-221 and accompanying text.
223-38 and accompanying text.
188-98 and accompanying text.
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Like the history of mortgage law in general, the history of the
law of mortgage prepayment exemplifies the inherent tension between the need for stable and predictable rules and the desire for
flexibility in particular circumstances. In perhaps no other body of
law has the role of equity jurisprudence been so significant in tempering strict rules of law. Both the strict rules of law and equitable
adjustments of such rules have been defended in terms of "common
sense." Each side in the prepayment dispute-debtors seeking to
prepay mortgages and creditors seeking to stabilize investmentshas characterized the arguments supporting their respective positions as self-evident conclusions drawn from allegedly clear premises. In reality, the premises are far from clear. Moreover, the legal
and equitable considerations have shifted with changes in perceptions of the nature and function of a mortgage from a security device whose primary function was to assure repayment of a debt to a
commercial investment designed to maximize yield.
These changes in mortgage law over the centuries occurred in
part through a shift in the understanding of mortgages from a function of property law to a function of contract law. From the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries mortgages were viewed
primarily as incidents of real property ownership and were governed by the legal and equitable rules of property. During the nineteenth century mortgages were viewed increasingly as financial
investments and were governed by principles of contract law.' 0 An
appreciation of this evolutionary story, this trial of common sense,
may enable us to see more clearly what new rules for mortgage prepayment may be appropriate in the future.
Part I of this Article investigates the history of mortgage prepayment and traces the transformation of the law in the early nineteenth century. Part II summarizes the law of prepayment charges
in the United States during the last 150 years. Part III evaluates
contemporary pressures that impact on residential mortgage prepayment and proposes contours for rules of prepayment in coming
years.
I
THE HISTORY OF MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT

Since the early nineteenth century the general rule has been
that a debtor cannot, without the lender's consent, prepay a mortgage debt. More precisely, when a specific amount of indebtedness
is secured by a mortgage'I covering the debtor's real property, and
10

See infra notes 89-102 and accompanying text.
I1
The term "mortgage" is used throughout this article to refer to the transfer of an
interest in real property as security for a debt. In this generic sense the term includes
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the note specifies a date certain for repayment of the debt, the
debtor is not entitled to pay the indebtedness before that date unless the lender agrees to accept such payment.12 This is the requirement of perfect tender in time.
Two of the earliest and most frequently cited precedents for
this rule are Abbe v. Goodwin (1829)13 and Brown v. Cole (1845). 14 In
Abbe the plaintiff purchased property from the defendant and executed a purchase money mortgage securing four interest-bearing
promissory notes, payable one per year for four years. Two years
later the plaintiff, having paid in full two of the notes, tendered to
the defendant the amounts due on the remaining two notes.' 5 The
defendant refused to accept the tender and the plaintiff brought an
action to redeem the mortgaged premises. The Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut dismissed the plaintiff's complaint with the
following words:
What is the object of this bill? It is to compel the defendant to
accept his money before it is due, and relinquish his security. In
other words, it is to substitute another contract for that which the
parties have entered into. It will be in vain to search for authorities to that effect. None are shewn. It is opposed to the whole
doctrine of contracts ....

It is surely too bald to insist that the

obligor, by his own act, may discharge the contract before it is
due. We might next expect to be pressed, on some real or imaginary equity, to enforce the payment of money before it is due, or
to permit an obligor to be discharged upon payment of fifty per
16
cent. of the sum due.
In Brown the plaintiff-debtor mortgaged a leasehold interest as
security for a loan in the amount of £1000, to be repaid in one year,
with five percent interest payable quarterly. Eight months later the
plaintiff-debtor had a chance to sell his property interest and tendered the full amount due on the note. The defendant-lender refused payment, and the plaintiff filed a bill before the English
Chancery Court seeking an order compelling redemption and reasformal mortgages utilized in lien theory states, deeds to secure debt utilized in title theory states, and deeds of trust. For historical background on the distinction between the
civil law and common-law approaches as it affects mortgage prepayments in title theory
and lien theory states, see infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
12 For variations on the obligation to make payment on a date certain, such as "on
or before a date certain" or "no later than a date certain," see infra notes 155-59 and
accompanying text.
13 7 Conn. 377 (1829).
14 14 L.J.-Ch. 167 (1845).
15 Abbe, 7 Conn. at 377. The plaintiff tendered not only the principal balance of
$225 due on each note together with accrued interest, but also the interest which would
have accrued on the notes at the date specified for final payment. Id. at 377.
16 Id. at 383. The facts suggest that the court may have perceived something other
that the right to prepay the debt as the controlling issue in this case. See infra note I11.
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signment of the property to the plaintiff.' 7 The Vice Chancellor
summarily dismissed the complaint, reasoning that "[i]f mortgagors
were allowed to pay off their mortgage money at any time after the
execution of the mortgage, it might be attended with extreme inconvenience to mortgagees, who generally advance their money as an
investment." 18
Subsequent cases1 9 and numerous nineteenth- and twentiethcentury treatises on mortgage law20 cite these two cases as authority
for the rule of perfect tender in time. By the turn of the twentieth
century each American jurisdiction had accepted this rule. A 1909
South Carolina Supreme Court opinion typifies judicial acceptance
of the rule: "In all the cases . . .where the question has been decided under the common law, it has been held that the creditor can2
not be compelled to give up his investment before maturity." '
A careful review of prenineteenth-century cases and treatises,
however, reveals that this rule of law was not as settled as courts and
commentators have suggested. The history of mortgage law from
the fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries actually suggests
that a debtor could redeem property from the mortgage upon payment of the full indebtedness at any time prior to the final due date.
The few cases that early nineteenth-century courts relied upon to
justify a contrary rule constitute weak authority at best. Nonetheless, subsequent cases and treatise writers uncritically accepted the
holdings in Abbe and Brown and the concept of perfect tender in time
became the rule of law.
17
18

Brown, 14 L.J.-Ch. at 167.
Id. at 168. As in Abbe, the plaintiff-debtor in Brown tendered not only outstanding

principal and accrued interest, but also interest which would have accrued at the date set
for final payment. The court accepted the rationale suggested by the defendant that
"[i]t would be extremely inconvenient to the defendant to receive back his money previous to the [original due date]. If such a principle was permitted, it might be the cause of
much loss to the defendant, by the funds falling during the time." Id. at 167.
19 See, e.g., Westminster Inv. Corp. v. Equitable Assurance Soc'y, 443 F.2d 653, 657
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dugan v. Grzybowski, 165 Conn. 173, 176, 332 A.2d 97, 99 (1973);
Bernard v. Toplitz, 160 Mass. 162, 163, 35 N.E. 673, 674 (1893); Dorsey v. Conrad, 49
Neb. 443, 456, 68 N.W. 645, 648 (1896); Weir v. Granite State Provident Ass'n, 56 N.J.
Eq. 234, 238, 38 A. 643, 644 (1897); Pyross v. Fraser, 82 S.C. 498, 499, 64 S.E. 407, 407
(1909). For a discussion of other nineteenth-century cases, see infra notes 110-13 and
accompanying text.
20 See, e.g., I F. HILLIARD, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY 475 n.(b) (4th ed. 1872) (1st ed. n.p. 1853); 2 L.JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1137 n.18 (8th ed. 1928); G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAw 422 (2d ed. 1985).

21 Pyross v. Fraser, 82 S.C. 498, 499, 64 S.E. 407, 407 (1909) (citing Abbe and
Brown). In Pyross the debtor tendered the final installment of $47 on the mortgage debt
approximately four months early. The creditor refused the tender and, following nonpayment of the final installment on the specified due date, brought a foreclosure action.
Holding that "tender before maturity was not a legal tender," the court affirmed the
decree of foreclosure. Id.
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An understanding of the transformation of the law of mortgage
prepayment in the early nineteenth century is useful for several reasons. First, it reveals the jurisprudential fallacy of blindly citing case
precedent for a proposition, and thereby assuming that the proposition has always been true. Second, it demonstrates the manner in
which judicial opinions, in attempting to justify a legal rule, often
fail to acknowledge underlying economic motivations. Instead of
acknowledging economic considerations, courts have based the rule
prohibiting prepayment of a debt on the concept of a reciprocal relationship between the debtor and creditor. The concept of reciprocity, however, had to be twisted from earlier formulations to fit
the new conclusion. Third, despite the absence of express economic analysis in the cases, the transformation of mortgage prepayment law illustrates the law's susceptibility to commercial and
economic forces. Finally, an appreciation of this nineteenth-century
transformation provides guidance for the evaluation of pending
changes in mortgage prepayment law.
A. Mortgage Prepayment Before the Nineteenth Century
The first extensive discussion of the English law of the gage
(the forerunner of the contemporary mortgage) is found in
Glanvill's twelfth-century treatise. 22 Glanvill identified three variables in the gage: (1) whether the gage has a fixed term; (2) whether
the creditor takes possession of the property during the term; and
(3) whether rents and profits from the property are to be applied in
reduction of the debt. 23 When there is a fixed term for payment of
the debt, the creditor cannot demand payment prior to the expiration of that term; if no term is specified, however, the debt is due on
demand. Glanvill averred, "When the debtor has repaid the debt,
the creditor must restore to him in its original condition the thing
gaged ... ."24 Although this proposition falls short of an affirmation of a debtor's right to prepay at will, Glanvill never suggested
22

THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY

CALLED GLANVILL 120-126 (G. Hall ed. and trans. 1965) [hereinafter GLANVILL]. For
summaries of the historical evolution of the early gage, see 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MArrLAND,
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 117-124 (1898 & photo. reprint 1968) and T. PLUCKNETT,
A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 603-609 (5th ed. 1956). The transfer of an
interest in property as security for a debt is not a phenomenon unique to western law.
References to real and personal property as a pledge and the obligation of the secured
party to return the pledge are found in the Deuteronomic Code, Deuteronomy 24:17, and

in Ezekiel 18:16.
23
24

GLANVILL, supra note 22, at 120-21.
Id. at 123. Glanvill separately stated, "It should, however, be noted that if any-

one has paid, or in due form offered to pay, what he owes, and the creditor still maliciously detains the gage, the debtor shall have the following writ upon complaint ......
Id. at 124. Although this clause appears without any indication of whether Glanvill was
referring to payment prior to or at the end of the term, the writ set forth immediately
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that prepayment without the creditor's consent was prohibited. 25
The second variable was significant in the late medieval period because the majority of gages required possession by the creditor during the period of indebtedness. 2 6 The third variable proved to be
the most problematic. Glanvill praised the living gage, the vivum
vadium, in which the rents and profits received by the creditor from
the land during the period of possession were applied against the
indebtedness. He condemned as "unjust and dishonorable" the
creditor's failure to apply these proceeds to the principal indebtedness, characterizing this as a dead gage-the mortuum vadium, or the
"mort gage." 2 7
Another variation on the early mortgage-the "Welsh mortgage"-permitted the creditor to take possession of the mortgaged
property and receive the rents and profits as a form of interest
rather than as payment of the principal. The Welsh mortgage differed from contemporary mortgages and from the earlier gage in
that it typically lacked a covenant by the debtor to repay the indebtedness 28 and did not specify a term for repayment of the debt. 29 In
the absence of such provisions, the creditor could not foreclose and
following the clause contains the phrase "until the end of a term which is now past." Id.
at 125.
25
At least one commentator has construed Glanvill's statement to mean that "[als
soon as the debt be discharged or payment properly tendered, the gagee is under the
duty of giving up possession to the gagor." Hazeltine, The Gage of Land in Medieval England, 17 HARV. L. REV. 549, 555 (1904) (emphasis added).
26
The distinction between immediate possession in the creditor and possession
remaining in the debtor until default is found in corresponding Roman, German, and
French law. See Hazeltine, supra note 25, at 550-551. For an extensive comparative law
analysis of early mortgage forms, see Wigmore, The Pledge-Idea: A Study in Comparative
Legal Ideas, 10 HARV. L. REV. 321 (1897).
27
GLANVILL, supra note 22, at 124. Though this form of gage was considered usurious and condemned as a sin, it was not prohibited as a matter of law and was apparently
widely used. Writing three hundred years later, Littleton adopted a different explanation for the origin of the French mort gage. He suggested that a mortgage contains the
obligation of the debtor to pay at the date certain (the performance of which terminates
the obligation) or to lose the property upon nonpayment (in which case the debtor's
ownership interest terminates). LITTLETON'S TENURES § 332 (E. Wambaugh ed. 1903)
[hereinafter LITrLETON]. Blackstone, Coke, and Kent essentially followed this explanation. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND *157; 2 E. COKE,
THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR A COMMENTARY UPON
LITTLETON 205a (C. Butler 19th ed. 1853); 4J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
* 137. A recent commentator has suggested a different derivation. See L. FRIEDMAN, A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 216 (1973) ("A mortgage is 'dead' to the creditors, since the
borrower stays in possession of the land and keeps whatever it produces, over and above
the debt.").
28
See, e.g., Turner v. Crane, 23 Eng. Rep. 394 (Ch. 1683); Lawley v. Hooper, 26
Eng. Rep. 962 (Ch. 1745).
29 See, e.g., Orde v. Heming, 23 Eng. Rep. 559 (1686); Yates v. Hambly, 26 Eng.
Rep. 618 (Ch. 1742).

1987]

MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT

295

receive title to the property,3 0 and the debtor had an indefinite period of time in which to redeem his property. 3 1
By the time of Littleton's Tenures (c. 1480), use of the Welsh
mortgage was declining for two reasons. First, creditors did not
know when, if ever, the debtor might repay the debt, reclaim the
property, and insist upon an accounting for the proceeds of the land
during the term of the debt. Second, the uncertainty of redemption
created significant obstacles to the subsequent alienability of the
subject property: the creditor could not foreclose and thus was unable to obtain clear title to the property to convey to subsequent
32
purchasers.
These difficulties led to the gradual replacement of the Welsh
mortgage by a security instrument in the form of a conditional fee.
As security for the indebtedness, the debtor conveyed to the creditor a fee simple estate upon the condition that if the debtor paid
principal and interest at a date certain, the creditor would reconvey
the estate to the debtor.3 3 This new device permitted the creditor to
anticipate a date certain upon which either repayment would be
made or the conditional limitation would disappear, leaving an estate in fee simple. It also brought strict legal enforcement of the
See, e.g., Curtis v. Holcombe, 6 L.J.C.P. 156 (1837).
In Yates v. Hambly, 26 Eng. Rep. 618 (Ch. 1742), for example, 40 years had
passed since the execution of the mortgage and the creditor had constructed improvements on the property. Even so, the debtor was allowed to redeem the property. Id. at
620. Lord Hardwicke rejected the creditor's statute of limitations defense on the
grounds that there was no forfeiture to give rise to a cause of action. Moreover, he
dismissed the argument that the mortgagee should not be the mortgagor's perpetual
bailiff by pointing out that the mortgagee received rents and profits throughout the period. For a comprehensive summary of Welsh mortgages, see 1 J. POWELL, TREATISE ON
THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 373a-407 (6th ed. 1828).
32 See, e.g., Howell v. Price, 22 Eng. Rep. 502, 502 (Ch. 1715) (Welsh mortgage
"redeemable even at law to the end of the world"). On the decline in the use of Welsh mortgages, see generally 1 J. POWELL, supra note 31, at 373a note (E).
33 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 129-30 (3d ed. 1923); see LrrTLETON, supra note 27, §§ 325-384. Though this could be styled as a condition precedent providing that "if the feoffor fail to pay at the date certain the specified sum, the
feoffee shall possess in fee," the strict limitation of the law of estates concerning creation
of an estate in fee to commence in the future led to the use of a defeasible fee in the
form of fee simple with a condition subsequent. See E. COKE, supra note 27, at 216a218b. The question of whether a formal reconveyance of the estate by the creditor to
the debtor accompanied by livery of seisin was required upon payment of the full indebtedness by proper tender (however defined) or whether extinguishment of the debt sufficed to defeat the condition and restore the estate to the debtor sparked litigation which
for several centuries was at the heart of the distinction between "lien theory" states and
"title theory" states. For example, New York very early took the position that extinguishment of the debt effectuated a release of the property pro tanto, while other states
required a reconveyance of the estate. Compare Farmers' Fire Ins. & Loan Co. v. Edwards, 26 Wend. 541 (N.Y. 1841) (payment extinguishes mortgage without need for
deed of reconveyance) with Parsons v. Wells, 17 Mass. 419 (1821) (deed of reconveyance
required). See also I J. POWELL, supra note 31, at 143a n.l.
30
31
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4
condition and forfeiture of the property by noncomplying debtors.3
Under some circumstances, however, debtors found relief in the
chancery courts' equitable power to grant what became known as
the "equity of redemption" 35-the debtor's right to redeem property from the mortgagee upon payment of principal, interest, and
costs. Chancery courts recognized the right of redemption even af36
ter passage of the date specified in the mortgage instrument.
The defeasible fee simple became the standard mortgage instrument during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 37 Its acceptance as a replacement for the Welsh mortgage was one step in
the evolution of the mortgage from a property concept to a contract
concept. Through the use of an instrument creating a defeasible fee
simple, the debtor usually retained possession of the property. The
mortgage instrument thus became primarily a means of providing
security for the debt and, consequently, the terms and conditions of
the contract took on utmost importance.
The numerous chancery court opinions during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries dealing with the timing for
repayment of mortgage debts generally fall into two categories.
The first category of cases encompasses debt obligations that specified a date certain for payment, and in which either the debtor or the
34
With one exception, in all of Littleton's examples of estates upon condition the
feoffor (the party conveying the estate) has the right to reenter upon payment of the
specified sum to the feoffee (the party receiving the conveyance). The only equivalent of
a purchase money mortgage as we know it today appears in § 336, where Littleton describes a feoffment made on a condition that "if the feoffee pay to the feoffor at such a
day between them limited, twenty pounds, then the feoffee shall have the land to him
and to his heirs." LITTLETON, supra note 27, § 336.
35 The overwhelming majority of cases dealing with prepayment and redemption
rights of mortgage debtors originated in chancery courts rather than common-law
courts. The reason for this phenomenon is not entirely clear, though there are three
plausible theories. One theory is that there simply was not a pleading available to a
debtor who attempted to pay a debt not yet due and was refused. Chancery jurisdiction
existed in large measure to provide remedies when none were specifically available at
law. See 11 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 593 (1938). A second approach suggests
simply that the chancery courts asserted jurisdiction to provide relief of a purely equitable nature in order to avoid the harshness of the common law's strict enforcement of
conditions. See T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 22, at 608. A third and probably most accurate
suggestion derives from chancery's traditional jurisdiction over uses and trusts. To the
extent that a mortgage existed as security for debt, the payment of debt to the mortgagee resulted in the mortgagee's holding the property as trustee, and the chancery courts
were willing to enforce the trust for the benefit of the mortgagor. See 1 J. POWELL, supra
note 31, at 143-44a; T. PLUCKNETr, supra note 22, at 608.
36
It is not possible to point to a specific date or case in which a chancery court first
formulated the equity of redemption. Although cases granting relief from forfeiture are
found in the early sixteenth century, the substantive development of this doctrine seems
to lie with the decisions of Lord Chancellor Nottingham in the late seventeenth century.
For the most comprehensive single study of the history of the equity of redemption, see
R. TURNER, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION (1931).
37
3 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 128-30.
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creditor died before the specified date.3 8 The second category encompasses debt instruments that failed to specify a date certain for
payment.3 9 From this latter group of cases emerged the maxims
"where a mortgage is once redeemable it is always redeemable" 40
and "equity will permit redemption of a mortgage even unto the
41
tenth generation."
Few cases during this period discussed the debtor's ability to
redeem prior to the date certain specified in the underlying debt
instrument. 42 The reason for the lack of case law on this point
seems to be that the debt instruments either contained no date for
payment, thus allowing the debtor to redeem at will, or specified a
date certain for payment, in which case the litigation usually involved an attempt to redeem after the specified date. Parliament
enacted in 1734 a statute 4 3 establishing foreclosure procedures that
could terminate a debtor's equity of redemption. This statute, however, dealt only with a mortgagee's action to foreclose or recover
the debt, not with a mortgagor's right to redeem prior to the date
specified in the mortgage.
Because prenineteenth-century mortgage law did not focus on
the debtor's right to prepay his or her indebtedness, the question
38 This category includes cases which construe the payment obligation to be the
debtor's personal obligation, that is, it must be paid during the debtor's life. See, e.g.,
Manning v. Burges, 22 Eng. Rep. 678 (Ch. 1663) (mortgagee refusing to receive his
money on tender after forfeiture shall lose his interest from tender); Price v. Perrie, 22
Eng. Rep. 1195 (Ch. 1702) (obligation with condition specifying payment by mortgagor
at any point during his life may be redeemed by mortgagor's heir).
39 E.g., Anonymous, 22 Eng. Rep. 1073 (Ch. 1681) (where mortgage is payable by
mortgagor or his heirs and mortgagor dies, heirs may redeem). This category also includes situations involving Welsh mortgages or obligations similar to Welsh mortgages.
See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
40 Anonymous, 22 Eng. Rep. at 1073.
41 Bacon v. Bacon, 21 Eng. Rep. 146 (Ch. 1639); see W. HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAND LAw 257 (1927) (mortgagor retains equity of redemption after legal right to redeem lapses).
42
For a discussion of the few cases addressing this point, see infra notes 51-53 and
accompanying text. The earliest case involving a debtor's attempt to pay the indebtedness prior to the date specified that I was able to find was decided in 1313. Erdingtone
v. Burnel, Y.B. Mich. 6 Edw. 2, pl. 6 8 (1313), reprintedin 34 SELDEN Soc'y 234 (1918). In
Burnel, the debtor tendered the sum due twelve days early but the payment was refused.
Following the debtor's death a few days later, his executors again tendered the sum due
on the date specified, and again it was refused. The issue was whether an absolute deed
could be modified by a collateral loan document; the court held that reconveyance to the
debtor was required.
43
Act for the More Easy Redemption and Foreclosure of Mortgages, 1794, 7 Geo.
2, ch. 20. This statute provided that if, after the filing of an ejectment action or an action
on a covenant by the mortgagee, the mortgagor paid to the mortgagee or into court all
principal and interest due, together with costs, the payment would be deemed in full
satisfaction of the indebtedness and the court would be empowered to compel reconveyance of the estate by the mortgagee.
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arises: on what basis could nineteenth-century judges and treatise
writers conclude that the debtor lacked such a right?
B.

The Evidence Reexamined

The pivotal nineteenth-century cases of Abbe v. Goodwin 44 and
Brown v. Cole4 5 concluded that when a date certain is specified the
debtor has no right to prepay without the creditor's consent. A
close examination of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century treatises
and cases, however, reveals little support for the courts' conclusions. 4 6 The evidence suggests that the rules regarding prepayment
were actually quite unsettled and that in numerous situations debtors did have a unilateral right to prepay.
Coke's Commentary upon Littleton addresses many of the requirements for proper tender by the debtor. For example, Coke states
that tender must be made at the place specified or, alternatively, to
the person of the creditor. 4 7 However, Coke does not address
whether the debtor is entitled to pay early when a date certain for
payment is specified. One could argue, perhaps, that decisions embracing the rule of perfect tender in time comport with the statement in Kent's Commentaries on American Law 48 that "tender of the
debt was required to be at the time and place prescribed. '49 Such
an argument, however, belies Kent's reliance on the passages in
Coke's Commentary Upon Littleton which deal with the location and
identity of the recipient of the tender, not the possibility of an early
tender. Both Coke and Kent were primarily concerned with the
debtor's ability to make payment after passage of the date certain.
To draw from these materials the proposition that a debtor is not
entitled to prepay is possible only by reading the passages out of
context.
In his important Treatise on the Law of Mortgage, Powell observed
that "although, generally, the mortgagee cannot compel the mortgagor to redeem before the time agreed upon, videlicet, the day appointed for repayment of the money; yet, if a hard bargain be made
7 Conn. 377 (1829).
14 L.J.-Ch. 167 (1845).
Abbe cites the seventeenth-century case of Talbot v. Braddill, 23 Eng. Rep. 402
(Ch. 1683), only as an exception to the rule of perfect tender in time. Abbe, 7 Conn. at
383. A more accurate interpretation of Talbot is that it stands for the reverse proposition, that is, that the debtor could prepay. See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
47
2 E. COKE, supra note 27, at 210.b. Both this portion of Coke's treatise and an
earlier part address the nature of the debtor's tender. Both sections focus on the required place of tender, and in both sections Coke affirmatively states that tender by the
debtor upon the person of the creditor is required if the sum is in gross. Id. at 202.a,
210.b.
48 J. KETr, supra note 27.
49 4 id. at 140.
44

45
46
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against the mortgagor, he will be admitted to redeem before that
time."' 50 The authorities Powell cited lead to a trilogy of cases decided by the Chancery Court at the end of the seventeenth century:
5
Newcomb v. Bonham,5 1 Howard v. Harris,5 2 and Talbot v. Braddill. 3
Upon careful examination, however, these cases do not support
Powell's assertion that prepayment may not be made without the
creditor's consent.
The issue in Newcomb was whether a mortgagor's heirs could
redeem the property where the mortgage expressly provided
(1) that the mortgagor could redeem at any time during his life, and
(2) that the property could never be redeemed if not redeemed during the mortgagor's lifetime. In the first opinion in this case, Chancellor Nottingham held that redemption by the mortgagor's heirs
should be permitted. 54 He noted that in this particular mortgage
there was no covenant to repay the sum specified. He may thus have
equated the mortgage in question with a Welsh mortgage. 5 5 Two
years later, shortly after Lord Nottingham's death, Lord North of
the Chancery Court reheard the case. At the rehearing Lord North
intimated that redemption should not be permitted under these circumstances and ordered a full hearing. 5 6 At the case's third appearance before the Chancery Court, Lord North reversed Lord
Nottingham's ruling and denied redemption, stressing two factors:
(1) the evidence suggested that this conveyance was intended as a
gift because there was no indebtedness underlying the mortgage,
and (2) because there was no covenant to repay, the mortgagee
57
could never foreclose.
supra note 31, at 337.
23 Eng. Rep. 266 (Ch. 1681),reh'granted,23 Eng. Rep. 422 (Ch. 1683),rev'd, 23
Eng. Rep. 435 (Ch. 1684).
52
23 Eng. Rep. 406 (Ch. 1683).
53 23 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ch. 1683), aff'd on rehearing, 23 Eng. Rep. 539 (Ch. 1686).
54 Newcomb, 23 Eng. Rep. at 266.
55 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. Nottingham's opinion reiterates
the general rule: "once a mortgage, and always a mortgage." Newcomb, 23 Eng. Rep. at
50

1J. POWELL,

51

267.
Newcomb, 23 Eng. Rep. at 422.
For several years prior to Nottingham's death, Francis North served as the Lord
Keeper of the Great Seal. Nottingham's legal reasoning has provoked a wide divergence
of opinions. Roper North, Lord Keeper North's brother, characterized Nottingham as a
formalist who "took pleasure in hearing and deciding; and gave way to all kinds of mo56

tions the counsel would offer: supposing that, if he split the hair, and, with his gold
scales, determined reasonably on one side of the motion, justice was nicely done. Not
imagining what torment the people endured, who were drawn from the law and there [in

Chancery] tost in a blanket." 1 R.

NORTH,

LivEs

OF THE NORTHS

422-23 (1826). In

contrast, Justice Story described Nottingham as the "father of Equity." 1J. STORY, supra
note 1, at 58.
57
Newcomb, 23 Eng. Rep. at 435. A note printed at the end of this opinion indicates

that the House of Lords affirmed on May 1, 1689. Id.
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The second case of the trilogy, Howard, involved an attempt by
a mortgagor's heir to redeem a mortgage containing restrictions
similar to those in Newcomb. In this case, which also came before the
Chancery Court three times, 58 the 1673 mortgage specified that the
mortgagor, or the male heirs of his body, could redeem the property
in 1686 and that none other than the mortgagor or his male heirs
could redeem. The mortgagor died without issue, and his widow
filed the petition to redeem the property in 1677. In the first proceeding, Lord Nottingham rejected the argument that the express
covenant served to prohibit redemption by the widow. 59 In dicta
Nottingham questioned whether prepayment would be permitted,
stating, "[o]f this there was some doubt, because the future day
seemed to be only in favor of the mortgagor, and yet it would be
hard that the mortgagee should be forced to receive his money
before the time without convenient warning." 60 In the final decision
in this case, Lord North permitted the mortgagor's wife to redeem
because the mortgage contained an express covenant by the mortgagor to pay the debt, thus giving the mortgagee a right to foreclose
at any time upon nonpayment. 6 ' This is a clear instance of a
debtor's being permitted to redeem in advance of the date specified
62
without the creditor's permission.
The third case, Talbot,63 is the only one of the trilogy cited in
Abbe v. Goodwin.6 4 As security for a loan of £320, the debtor in 1657
conveyed to his creditor various possessory and reversionary interests. The debtor could redeem the security interests in March 1688
by paying £380. At the time of the original conveyance, the possessory interests yielded £15 per year and the reversionary interests
yielded between £8 and £17 per year. Three years after the mortgage's execution the first of the reversionary interests became possessory (yielding £17 per year). The creditor thus received £32 per
year. The debtor in 1682 petitioned Chancery for an order permitting redemption and an accounting of the profits received by the
58
See 23 Eng. Rep. 406 (Ch. 1683); 79 SELDEN Soc'Y 617 (1677/8); 23 Eng. Rep.
288 (Ch. 1681).
59 Howard, 79 SELDEN Soc'Y at 617.
60 Id.
61
Howard, 23 Eng. Rep. at 406.
62
One should not rely too heavily on Howard for this proposition, however. Once
the mortgagor died without issue, the condition could not be fulfilled without judicial
intervention.
63
23 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ch. 1683), aff'd on rehearing, 23 Eng. Rep. 539 (Ch. 1686).
64 Abbe, 7 Conn. at 383. In Abbe, the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut rejected Talbot as precedent. The court suggested that the case was not on point because
it dealt only with an unusual situation involving an unreasonable bargain. Id. Powell
suggested that Talbot was the exception which proved the rule of perfect tender in time.
1 J. POWELL, supra note 3 1, at 337.
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creditor. After declaring that he "thought this an unreasonable bargain," 65 Lord North ordered redemption and appointed a date for
redemption prior to the original date of 1688.66
Although these three cases are cited as the primary authorities
for the rule of perfect tender in time,6 7 each case suggests that the
debtor did have the right to redeem the property in advance of the
date specified for payment. Both Talbot and Howard permitted early
redemption. In Newcomb, redemption was not permitted, but the
68
factual findings strongly suggest that no loan was ever made.
Neither these nor any other cases decided prior to 1825 expressly
prohibitted prepayment by the debtor. It is equally true, however,
that no case has been found to support the general proposition that
prepayment was permitted during this period. Thus, the direct evidence is inconclusive as to the status of prepayment during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Nonetheless, the indirect
evidence, as reflected in the views of courts and commentators on
the nature and function of mortgages, suggests the absence of any
firm rule prohibiting prepayment.
The equity cases discussed above recognized that it might be
inconvenient for the creditor to accept prepayment on short notice.
The resolution of this problem, Lord Nottingham suggested, was to
permit prepayment only when the debtor gave the creditor sufficient
notice of prepayment. 69 Subsequent cases confirm that courts ordi70
narily required six months' notice.
Talbot, 23 Eng. Rep. at 402.
Id. at 402-03.
Subsequent cases and commentaries most frequently cite Talbot as precedent.
See, e.g., Abbe v. Goodwin, 7 Conn. 377, 383 (1829); Ellis v. Craig, 7 Johns. Ch. 7, 11
(N.Y. 1823); R. CoomE, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF MORTGAGE * 19; H. HERMAN, COMMENTARIES ON MORTGAGES AND VENDORS' LIENS 11 (1879); 1 J. POWELL, supra note 31,
at 337.
68 Newcomb, 23 Eng. Rep. at 267; see also Fawcet v. Bowers, 23 Eng. Rep. 785 (Ch.
1693) (redemption in advance of due date decreed where debtor, in consideration of a
loan of 300, agreed to pay 60 per year for seven years where debt secured by demise and
redemise).
69 See Howard, 79 SELDEN Soc'y at 617 ("[T]here was some doubt [as to whether
there could be early redemption], because the future day seemed to be only in favour of
the mortgagor, and yet it would be hard that the mortgage should be forced to receive
his money... without convenient warning.").
70 E.g., Anonymous, 22 Eng. Rep. 508 (Ch. 1740) (debtor given six months to redeem following decree of foreclosure). Six months' notice was not required, however,
once the mortgagee brought a bill of ejection. Sharpell v. Blake, 22 Eng. Rep. 506 (Ch.
1737).
"It must, however, be observed, that a mortgagor cannot pay off the mortgage debt
at any other than the time stipulated, without giving six previous months' notice, according to the rule of equity hereafter mentioned." R. COOTE, supra note 67, at * 19. Coote
also noted that it had been "lately held, that the mortgagee cannot be compelled to
receive payment before the day named in the mortgage deed, though the full amount of
principal and interest up to the day be offered him." Id. (citing Brown v. Cole, 14 LJ.65
66
67
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A review of late seventeenth-century cases on payment of mortgage debts shows that mortgage transactions at that time primarily
concerned the repayment of debt, rather than the conveyance of
real property. "[I]n natural justice and equity," Lord Nottingham
observed in 1675, "the principal right of the mortgagee is to the
money, and his right to the land is only as a security for the
money. .. "71 This perspective on the nature and function of mortgages led Samuel Carter, in the first English treatise devoted exclusively to mortgage law, to conclude that "as soon as the Mortgager
pays the Money the Lands belong to him, and only the Money to the
Mortgagee."' 7 2 Blackstone, 7 3 Powell, 74 and Kent 75 reflect similar
orientations toward the concept of a mortgage. In light of this
understanding, the rule of perfect tender in time would have illserved the mortgage's primary purpose-securing payment of the
debt.
Even at the turn of the nineteenth century, debtors in the
United States successfully argued for prepayment. In McHard v.
Whetcrofit, 76 for instance, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed
two lower court opinions which held that tender before the specified
date was ineffectual. 7 7 Both cases arose out of a bond dated September 24, 1778, which specified payment "at or upon" September
1, 1788.78 The debtor pleaded payment on March 7, 1781. 7 9 Both
counsel agreed that the civil law provided that the specification of a
date certain for payment was intended to benefit the debtor and that
Ch. 167 (1845), discussed supra text accompanying note 45). Coote was one of the few
authors to recognize that Brown altered the traditional rule permitting prepayment with
notice.
71
Thornborough v. Baker, 36 Eng. Rep. 1000, 1001 (1675).
72
S. CARTER, LEX VADIORUM, THE LAW OF MORTGAGES 2 (1706) (emphasis added).
For a summary of the treatise tradition in mortgage law, see 3 W. HOLDsWORTH, supra
note 33, at 380-83 (1938).
73
3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *435. Blackstone's analysis adopts this emphasis and suggests the debtor's ability to prepay a mortgage: "the payment of principal,
interest, and costs ought at any time, before judgment executed, to have saved the forfeiture in a court of law, as well as in a court of equity." Id.
74
1 J. POWELL, supra note 31, at 143a-45. Powell suggests that this was true at law
as well as in equity. Id.
75
4 J. KENT, supra note 27, at * 193-94. Kent's view typifies this interpretation of
the nature of mortgages: "The debt, generally speaking, is considered to be the principal, and the land only the incident; and discharging or forgiving the debt, with the delivery of the security, any time before foreclosure, extinguishes the mortgage and no
reconveyance is necessary to restore the title to the mortgagor." Id. at *193.
76 Although no opinion of the Court of Appeals is given, the reports of the lower
court opinions indicate the ultimate outcome of the dispute. See McHard v. Whetcroft, 3
H. & McH. 85, 91 (Md. 1791); Quynn v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 136, 139 (Md. 1793).
77 McHard, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Quynn, 3 H. & McH. at 137.
78
McHard, 3 H. & McH. at 85; Quynn, 3 H. & McH. at 136.
79 McHard, 3 H. & McH. at 85.

1987]

MORTGAGE PREPA YMENT

the debtor could pay at any time.8 0 They differed, however, as to
whether the common law of England and America followed the civil
law position. Counsel for the debtor argued that the common law
incorporated the civil law on this point,8 l while counsel for the creditor insisted that the common law did not permit prepayment. 8 2
The court of appeals found for the debtor in both cases without
83
written opinion.
An early New York chancery case, Ellis v. Craig,8 4 similarly reflects the changing perception of the nature and function of mortgages and the movement toward the rule of perfect tender in time.
In Ellis, the debtor signed a bond datedJuly 1818 to pay $10,000 on
May 1, 1825, with interest payable quarterly. The debtor tendered
the full amount of principal, plus accrued interest, on August 25,
1820. The creditor refused the tender and insisted that he did not
have to accept the principal until May 1825. The debtor ceased paying interest, and the creditor filed for foreclosure.8 5 Evidently the
case troubled the chancellor, who initially felt that the authorities
supported the debtor's position. 6 Upon rehearing, the chancellor
concluded that the debtor did not have the right to repay the debt
prior to the specified maturity date.8 7 As in McHard, the court care80
McHard, 3 H. & McH. at 87, 89-90; Quynn, 3 H. & McH. at 137-38; cf State ex rel.
Elliott v. Ratzburg, 215 La. 295, 40 So. 2d 395 (1949); 1J. DOMAT, THE CIviL LAW IN ITS
NATURAL ORDER 1 2245 (L. Gushing ed. 1850 & photo. reprint 1980); 1 M. POTHIER, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 216-217 (W. Evans trans. 3d Am. ed. 1853) ("It
remains to observe concerning the effect of the term, that being presumed to be inserted
in favor of the debtor... the debtor may very well defend himself from payment before
the expiration of the term, but the creditor cannot refuse receiving if the creditor [sic] is
willing to pay ... at least unless it appears from the circumstances that the term was
appointed in favour of the creditor, as well as of the debtor.") (citations omitted).
81 McHard, 3 H. & McH. at 90; Quynn, 3 H. & McH. at 137-38.
82 McHard, 3 H. & McH. at 87. The extent to which seventeenth-century English
chancery courts followed the civil law in fashioning their equitable decrees as they pertained to mortgages is unclear, though some commentators consider it to be significant.
See, e.g., H. HERMAN, supra note 67, at 19 ("There can be but little doubt that the modem mortgage... is derived from the Roman civil law ..
").
83 From subsequent litigation involving the same parties it appears that the defendant-debtor had tendered funds in full payment of one debt and, upon refusal by the
creditor, tendered the same funds in satisfaction of a second debt and, later, in satisfaction of a third. In response to this maneuvering the court of appeals evidently decided
that it had had enough and, in its third decision involving these parties, reversed a lower
court award in favor of the debtor. Quynn v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 352, 356 (Md.
1795).
84
7 Johns. Ch. 7 (N.Y. 1823).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 8. "When the cause was argued the first time, it appeared to me that the
weight of authority was in favor of the pretension of the [debtor], and I thought myself
bound to yield to that authority, against the dictates of my own judgment. The rehearing and the second argument were applied for, at my suggestion, to the end that a fuller
research might be made, and a more mature consideration given to the case." Id.
87 Id. at 13.

304

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:288

fully evaluated the civil law principle that a debtor could prepay a
debt. This time, however, the court held the civil law doctrine inapplicable. The court found that the specification of a date for repayment of principal with interest payable periodically indicated that
the parties intended the debt to remain outstanding for the period
and that both the creditor and debtor have an equal interest in preserving the period of payment.8 8
There is little evidence to support a rule prohibiting mortgage
prepayment until the beginning of the nineteenth century. The evidence suggests first that the question of prepayment rights was
rarely litigated, second, that courts frequently permitted prepayment, and third, that the rules of law were in a state of flux during
this period. Judges and treatise writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who suggest that the rule of perfect tender in time
has always been the rule are mistaken. Establishing this error, however, does not explain why or how courts could, within a space of
fifty years, embrace with vigor the rule of perfect tender in time. An
understanding of the influences behind this transformation in the
law and the method by which courts justified the change offers insight into the development of mortgage law in the past and in the
future.
C.

The Transformation to Perfect Tender in Time

Evolving economic conditions induced the transformation to
the rule of perfect tender in time. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries secured real estate transactions generally occurred between parties with long-standing and frequent contact in relatively
small, closed communities. Prior to the creation of the Bank of Eng88

Id. The court distinguished situations in which the instrument did not require

payment of interest during the period of indebtedness, but instead required all interest
to be paid at the outset of the loan or at the conclusion of the loan. In such cases, the
court acknowledged that the specification of a maturity date would likely be solely for
the benefit of the debtor, and thus waivable by the debtor. Id. at 10-11. The chancellor's
opinion is replete with sympathetic references to the elderly and infirm and to economic
policy arguments:
A prolonged time of payment, when money is loaned upon interest, payable periodically, is not always given for the accommodation of the debtor.
The time is intended to meet the will and the wishes of both parties; and
in the case of persons who are unable to earn money by their own exertions, or to employ it themselves profitably in business, such as aged and
infirm persons, women and infants, and also in the case of literary and
charitable institutions, a safe investment of money with a prolonged time
of payment of the principal, and short times of payment of interest, is
most likely to meet their views, and promote their welfare. The interest of
money is liable to fluctuation, and money itself is a marketable commodity, and subject to a greater or less demand, according to the vicissitudes
of trade and credit.

Id. at 8-9.
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land in 1694, borrowers generally executed mortgages in favor of
merchant creditors to secure debts which were viewed as secondary
to the obligation to provide goods and services. A mortgage conveyance as part of the purchase price of property was quite rare. By
the eighteenth century's end other major banking institutions had
begun to emerge, serving to depersonalize lending relationships.8 9
In the rapidly expanding agricultural economy of the early nineteenth-century United States, the purchase of property through the
use of purchase money mortgages became quite common.
The first half of the nineteenth century was characterized by instability in banking and finance. The rule of perfect tender in time
for mortgage prepayments served as one step towards achieving a
modicum of stability. The first three decades of that century witnessed significant fluctuations in wholesale prices, fueled in large
part by rapid growth in the number of notes issued by commercial
state banks. By 1811 the total amount of such notes in circulation
was roughly twice the total specie supply of the country. 90 Such
notes were backed by inadequate security, invariably leading to significant depreciation in their value. 9 ' Banks began to insist on repayment of debts in hard specie or in the notes of another bank. 92 A
panic in 1818 and 1819, induced partially by the sale of large tracts
of public western land, resulted in a collapse in market prices. Nevertheless, by 1829, the date of Abbe v. Goodwin, both market prices
and the number of land sales had increased tremendously. In that
year the federal government generated $1.5 million from the sale of
1.2 million acres of public land; by 1836 this figure had increased to
93
$25 million from the sale of 20 million acres.
Arguments before the court in McHardv. Whetcrofi 9 4 suggested
that speculation in land prices prompted the adoption of the rule of
89 With a few short-lived exceptions, pre-Revolutionary America had no established
commercial banks. By 1820 there were 300 banks and by 1860 there were 1,500. L.
DAvis, J. HUGHES & D. MCDOUGALL, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 165 (3d ed. 1969).
90
C. WRIGHT, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 276 (1941).

91
It was not unusual for banks to have notes in circulation whose face value was
several hundred times the amount of the issuer's cash reserves. W. SHULTZ & M. CAINE,
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES 149 (1937); see Ellis v. Craig, 7 Johns.
Ch. 7 (N.Y. 1823) (citing interest rate fluctuation as reason for denying right of
prepayment).
92 In Tillou v. Britton, 9 NJ.L. 152 (1827), the debtor executed a note for $250 to a
bank and received bank notes in exchange. The bank subsequently transferred the
debtor's note to a third party. Prior to the maturity date set forth in the note, the debtor
tendered to the bank the original notes he had received upon execution of his promissory note. The bank refused to accept its own devalued notes, insisting on specie. The
bank's assignee brought an action to recover on the note. The court held that the
debtor's tender of the bank's own notes prior to the maturity date was ineffective. Id. at

171-72.
93
94

P. STUDENSKI & H. KROoss, FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE
McHard v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 85 (Md. 1791).

UNITED STATES

99 (1963).
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perfect tender in time. Counsel for the creditor argued that the
specification of a date for payment was for the benefit of both parties, indicating a conscious decision by both parties to allocate the
risk of currency depreciation over the term of the debt:
As I [the creditor] will bind myself not to call on you before that
day, you shall not pay me before that period; you shall not tie my
hands and be at liberty to speculate on me and pay me at the lowest state of depreciation to which paper money may be reduced;
but as you
take the chance of a fall, give me the chance of its rising
95
in value.
In the early nineteenth century, the view of mortgages as economic investments entailing the risk of significant monetary functions dominated. In contrast to the earlier period in which
mortgages were viewed in terms of property laws governing ownership and possession, mortgages increasingly came to be viewed as
commercial investment opportunities, with a corresponding need
for contractual stability and predictability. The same argument used
in McHard was one of the deciding factors in Ellis v. Craig,9 6 was at
the heart of the creditor's counsel's argument in the landmark case
of Brown v. Cole,9 7 and was repeated throughout the country during
the early decades of the nineteenth century. "[T]he maker of a
note," stated one court in 1827, "who had received the whole
amount of it, should not be permitted to pay it off with a depreciated
currency." 9 8
The greatly increased use of negotiable instruments reinforced
the contractual nature of the mortgage. 99 Commercial lenders
viewed debt instruments as negotiable by necessity, and the debtor's
ability to retire the debt prior to the date specified in the note created significant problems of uncertainty.' 0 0 Prior to the adoption in
the late nineteenth century of negotiable instrument laws in the
United States, an assignee of a mortgagee who received the note
without notice to the mortgagor took the mortgage with numerous
Id. at 86-87.
7 Johns. Ch. 7 (N.Y. 1823); see supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
97
14 L.J.-Ch. 167 (1845). "It would be extremely inconvenient to the defendant to
receive back his money previous to the 1st of April, on which day the plaintiff was bound
to repay the amount. If such a principle was permitted, it might be the cause of much
loss to the defendant, by the funds falling during the time." Id.; see also Moore v. Cord,
14 Wis. 231, 236 (1861) ("But can it not be said that the creditor may have an interest in
keeping his money invested, upon security, rather than to have it in his own hands?").
98
Tillou v. Britton, 9 NJ.L. 152, 174 (1827).
99 See generally M. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860, at
211-216, 265-66 (1977) (discussing impact of negotiable instruments on contract law
and effect of merging of law and equity jurisdiction on mortgage law).
100 Though the law of negotiable instruments requires that the note specify payment
at a date certain, the existence of an acceleration clause does not necessarily impair the
note's negotiability. U.C.C. § 3-109 comment 4 (1977).
95
96
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attendant risks.10 ' By the end of the nineteenth century, payment of
the debt to the original mortgagee before the date specified in the
note was not a defense to an action brought by a holder in due
10 2
course without notice of the payment.
Courts rarely acknowledged the economic motivations for the
rule of perfect tender in time. Instead, courts rationalized the
change by citing the reciprocal relationship between debtor and
creditor: because the creditor could not demand payment at will, the
debtor could not prepay at will. 10 3 This reasoning twisted the language of earlier chancery court cases holding that the remedy ought
to be reciprocal' 04 -the right of the debtor to have his property
freed of the mortgage was reciprocal to the right of the creditor to
foreclose if the debtor failed to pay. Thus, in Howard v. Harris,105
the creditor argued that early redemption violated the reciprocity
requirement because the creditor could not foreclose prior to the
date specified. The court allowed prepayment, finding reciprocity
not in the timing of the payment, but between the obligation of the
debtor to repay and the right of the mortgagee to foreclose upon
10 6
nonpayment.
In contrast, under the nineteenth-century formula for reciprocity, a debt not payable upon demand of the creditor is not redeemable upon demand of the debtor. 10 7 If, prior to the nineteenth
10I See, e.g., Hoyle v. Cazabat, 25 La. Ann. 438 (1873) (holding, despite strong dissent, that prepayment of note extinguished debt where assignee of note took without
notice to debtor); see also 3J. POWELL, supra note 31, at 903-911; R. CooE, supra note 67,
at *301-05.
102 E.g., Watson v. Wyman, 161 Mass. 96, 36 N.E. 692 (1894).
103
In the context of the Welsh mortgage is was argued that reciprocity was lacking
and that redemption should not be permitted. The argument was expressly rejected,
however, most likely because in a Welsh mortgage the mortgagee remained in possession of the property with a right to receive all rents and profits in lieu of interest. Curtis
v. Holcombe, 6 L.J.C.P. 156 (1837); Lawley v. Hooper, 26 Eng. Rep. 962 (Ch. 1745);
Yates v. Hambly, 26 Eng. Rep. 618 (1742).
104 E.g., Copelston v. Boxwill, 22 Eng. Rep. 664 (1660); 1 J. POWELL, supra note 31,
at 335. Under the concept of reciprocal remedies, the debtor's ability to redeem a
Welsh mortgage despite creditor's inability to foreclose was viewed as an exception to
the requirement of mutuality. See Talbot v. Braddill, 23 Eng. Rep. 539 (Ch. 1686) (expressly rejecting argument of creditor's counsel that "where one side cannot foreclose,
the other ought not to redeem"). Subsequent treatise writers cite Talbot and Welsh
mortgages as exceptions to the requirement of reciprocal remedies. See R. CooTE, supra
note 67, at * 19. Coote recognized subtle distinctions in the requirements of mutuality,
suggesting that "[t]he mutuality... need not run quatorpedibus; the rule only requires
that it shall not be competent to one party alone to consider it a mortgage." Id.; see also
Exton v. Greaves, 23 Eng. Rep. 371 (Ch. 1682) (redemption permitted notwithstanding
creditor's failure to compel payment).
105 23 Eng. Rep. 406 (Ch. 1683).
106
Id. at 407-08. The civil law's express assumption that the date specified in the
debt instrument is for the benefit of the debtor also reflects this perspective. See supra
notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
107
See Hanson v. Fox, 155 Cal. 106, 107, 99 P. 489, 490 (1909); People v. O'Brien,
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century, the specification of a date for repayment was viewed solely
to benefit the debtor, by the early portion of that century the creditor insisted that such a date was intended to benefit him as well. 10 8
What was ignored in the transition to this formula was the fact that
the creditor by this time possessed two independent remedies for
nonpayment: the right to foreclose upon the property and the right
to sue the debtor directly on the debt. 10 9 In addition, the terms of a
mortgage usually permitted the mortgagee to accelerate the entire
indebtedness upon the mortgagor's default in making an installment payment. Thus, the language of reciprocity took on a radically
different meaning in order to rationalize this transformation in the
law.
Contrary to traditional wisdom, the common law prior to 1825
did not clearly deny the debtor the right to prepay his mortgage.
Radical economic changes during the early nineteenth century exerted pressure on the debtor-creditor relationship and forged a
change in the law. The history of mortgage payment in the United
States since 1825 reflects the growing dominance of contract law
principles over property law principles in the interpretation of mortgage clauses. If the common-sense requirements of stability and
predictability in economic investments justified the rule of perfect
tender in time, the rigidity of this new rule prompted new demands
for equitable relief.
II
THE AMERICAN LAW OF MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT

Abbe v. Goodwin 110 marked a critical point in the transformation
of mortgage prepayment law. In embracing the rule of perfect
tender in time, the decision reflects the increasing application of
contract law principles to questions of mortgage law. The court
stated, "it is surely too bald to insist that the obligor, by his own act,
may discharge the contract before it is due.""' By the latter part of
111 N.Y. 1, 61, 18 N.E. 692, 709 (1888); Peryer v. Pennock, 95 Vt. 313, 315-16, 115 A.
105, 105-06 (1921).
108
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
109 A seventeenth-century creditor's cause of action for nonpayment of an installment due was in assumpsit as opposed to debt. See 7 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at
78-79 (1926).
110 7 Conn. 377 (1829); see supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
111
Abbe, 7 Conn. at 384. Notwithstanding Abbe's reputation as a leading case on
mortgage prepayment, prepayment was actually a minor issue in the litigation. The
creditor, Goodwin, sold land to the debtor, Abbe, and received a purchase money mortgage for one hundred percent of the purchase price, securing four promissory notes
payable one per year for four years. Evidently, during the second year Goodwin discovered that his deed to Abbe described the property as larger than it should have been. In
a separate suit for ejectment filed by Goodwin shortly before Abbe commenced his suit
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the nineteenth century most American courts had little difficulty embracing the rule of perfect tender in time. Courts justified the rule
by invoking freedom of contract principles. An 1861 statement of
the Wisconsin Supreme Court is typical:
[C]an it not be said that the creditor may have an interest in keeping his money invested, upon security, rather than to have it in his
own hands? Can it not be said that he may insist on it even arbitrarily or obstinately, and without advantage to himself, so long as
the contract provides for? Itwould seem so ... .112
Between 1850 and 1930, courts across the country adopted the
rule."13 Today, the rule of perfect tender in time remains in efto compel acceptance of prepayment, Goodwin sought to have the error corrected. In
an opinion heavily criticized by the Supreme Court of Errors, the lower court in the
prior action ruled against Goodwin. In the principal action, Goodwin once again raised
the issue of mistake. Abbe argued that Goodwin was barred by the result in the prior
action and that Abbe had the right to prepay the mortgage. The Supreme Court of
Errors ruled against Abbe on both issues and in doing so made history on the question
of a debtor's right to prepay a debt. Id. at 383.
Several early nineteenth-century Massachusetts opinions contain language advocating a similar rule. In Saunders v. Frost, 22 Mass. 259 (1827), the prepayment issue
appears to have been rendered moot by the debtor's tender upon the date specified
prior to the court's opinion. The court nonetheless stated, "The tender can be considered valid only in relation to the interest and the amount of the note which was due, for
the mortgagee could not be compelled to receive payment until it became due." Id. at
266. On the other hand, Kingman v. Pierce, 17 Mass. 247 (1821), did not involve a note
secured by a mortgage; it involved litigation over a promissory note. Although the primary issue was whether the note was acquired from a third party authorized by the creditor to accept payment, the court suggested, "The promisee was entitled to interest, until
the day agreed upon for payment." Id. at 248.
112 Moore v. Cord, 14 Wis. 231 (1861). The court did not actually rule on the prepayment question; rather, it found that an attempted foreclosure was premature. The
court did note, however, that under the civil law the debtor could freely prepay and that
the court in McHard v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 85 (Md. 1791), appeared to adopt this
position. Moore, 14 Wis. at 236. The court also noted the unusual nature of the claim:
This is a question somewhat novel in its character, and one upon
which authorities are not numerous, owing doubtless to the rarity of the
occurrence as a matter of fact. It is seldom, at least in modem times, that
the debtor offers to pay before his debt is due, including interest up to
the time [sic] when it is to become due; still more seldom, such offer
being made, that the creditor refuses it.
Id.
113
See Bowen v.Julius, 141 Ind. 310, 40 N.E. 700 (1895) (tender one day early held
ineffectual); Abshire v. Corey, 113 Ind. 484, 487, 15 N.E. 685, 686 (1888); DaSilva v.
Turner, 166 Mass. 407, 411, 44 N.E. 532, 533 (1896); Trahant v. Perry, 253 Mass. 486,
149 N.E. 149 (1925); Moore v. Kime, 43 Neb. 517, 521, 61 N.W. 736, 738 (1895) ("The
note, to secure which his mortgage was given, was payable at a day certain. The payee
was not under any obligation to accept payment before maturity, and [the debtor] acquired no rights as against [the creditor] by offering to pay before .. ");Missouri, K. &
T. Ry. v. Union Trust Co., 156 N.Y. 592, 599, 51 N.E. 309, 313 (1898) ("The outstanding bondholders have a right to receive their debt only as provided by the contract.
That right is as sacred as to receive it at all."); People v. O'Brien, 111 N.Y. 1, 61, 18 N.E.
692, 709 (1888) ("The time of payment of a pecuniary obligation is a material provision
in such contract, and we know of no authority to require a creditor to accept payment in
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fect1 4 except where it has been recently modified by judicial deci1 16
sion 11 5 or by statute.
To the extent that courts expressed an underlying rationale for
the adoption of the rule of perfect tender in time, they merely repeated the common-sense arguments implicit in earlier prepayment
cases. Efficiency and economic expectations became dominant justifications for the rule. The dogma of reciprocity between debtor and
creditor was also repeated frequently to justify the rule. Yet a careful examination of such economic and philosophical arguments
reveals their inadequacy. The rule has been and continues to be
applied in ways entirely inconsistent with its economic justifications. 1 1 7 Similarly, the reciprocity argument fails to take account of
cases in which reciprocity is admittedly lacking. I' Notwithstanding
these difficulties, however, economic and philosophical perspectives
on mortgage prepayment are as important now as they were at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. Clarifying these perspectives
permits us to determine the extent to which they justify a rule of
perfect tender in time in the future.
A.

The Economic Justifications

Explaining the custom of denying prepayment rights, one textwriter stated, "This freedom of the mortgagee from anticipation is
of increasing value as the mortgage becomes more and more an investment instrument designed to secure a regular flow of income.
Current institutional mortgages customarily exact substantial
amounts as conditions of accepting prepayment." ' 1 9 Elaborating
on this assertion, the Supreme Court of Connecticut noted,
advance, any more than to compel such payment by the debtor."); Pyross v. Fraser, 82
S.C. 498, 499, 64 S.E. 407, 407 (1909) ("Few adjudications of the question here made as
to the right of a debtor to pay his debt before maturity are to be found, for the reason
that a creditor rarely refuses to accept a premature tender of his debt when it includes
interest to the date of maturity."); Peryer v. Pennock, 95 Vt. 313, 319, 115 A. 105, 106
(1921); see also Smiddy v. Grafton, 163 Cal. 16, 124 P. 433 (1912) (holder of first mortgage cannot be compelled to accept early payment to clear title); Shipp v. Anderson, 173
S.W. 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) (debtor has no right to compel creditor to accept payment before maturity).
114
See, e.g., Lindsay Realty Co. v. Bellina, 320 So. 2d 572, 574 (La. Ct. App. 1975)
("purchaser does not have the right of prepay unless that right is specifically given to
him"); Peter Fuller Enters. v. Manchester Sav. Bank, 102 N.H. 117, 120, 152 A.2d 179,
181 (1959) ("A mortgagor, however, in the absence of a provision so providing has no
right to pay in advance of maturity."); see also In re Agostini, 42 Del. 347, 33 A.2d 306
(Super. Ct. 1943) ("Before the law day, or the day the mortgage is due, the mortgagor
has, in general, no right to make payment of the mortgage ... .
115 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
116 See infra notes 185, 187 & 194-96 and accompanying text.
117
See infra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
118
1 19

See infra notes 152-87 and accompanying text.
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In contrast, a mortgage note designed primarily to give the lender
security for the timely repayment of his money at a profitable rate
of interest will more likely contain a prepayment clause without a
penalty attached. The object of the clause is generally to encourage repayment, whereas in the absence of such a clause,
courts tend to construe the mortgage note as intended to secure
regular investment income to the mortgage over a definite period
120
of time.
The economic pressures that underlie the rule of perfect tender
in time have never been comprehensively analyzed. The cases
themselves, however, posit four basic economic justifications where
the mortgage instrument does not address the prepayment issue:
(1) the creditor's transaction costs resulting from unanticipated reinvestment of the principal; (2) the need for predictable returns on
investments; (3) the need for the stability provided by regular payments over time; and (4) the desire of the creditor to maximize yield
beyond the contractual interest rate.121
1.

Transaction Costs

Courts have recognized since the late seventeenth century the
inconvenience to the creditor which could be caused by an unanticipated payment of indebtedness as a factor in determining prepayment rights. Lord Nottingham's proposed solution to the problem
required that the creditor receive reasonable notice of any advance
repayment. 122 By the mid-eighteenth century, courts expressly acknowledged the transaction costs incurred by creditors in locating
new investment opportunities. 12 3 Brown v. Cole 124 relied heavily on
the "extreme inconvenience" creditors would suffer if debtors could
prepay at will. 125 A 1977 Florida appeals court agreed that a prepayment penalty reflects in part "the cost to [the creditor] of reloanDugan v. Grzybowski, 165 Conn. 173, 176 n.2, 332 A.2d 97, 99 n.2 (1973).
These four justifications are not exhaustive; they are indicative of the most common justifications. Other motivations arise in varied fact situations. See, e.g., Abbe v.
Goodwin, 7 Conn. 377 (1829) (attempt by purchaser in seller-financed transaction to
prepay mortgage in order to force release of property, thereby precluding argument of
erroneous legal description); see also Peter Fuller Enters. v. Manchester Say. Bank, 102
N.H. 117, 152 A.2d 179 (1959) (creditor refused prepayment to prevent sale of encumbered business to purchaser intent on moving business out of state to detriment of regional economy) (discussed in A. AXELROD, C. BERGER & Q.JOHNSTONE, LAND TRANSFER
AND FINANCE: CASES AND MAtERIALS 109 (2d ed. 1978)); cf. Harmon, Prepayment Penalties:
PredictingControversy over Enforceability Based Upon the Late Due-on-Sale Question, I R.E. FIN.
LJ.326 (1986).
122
See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
123
This rationale was suggested in Lawley v. Hooper, 26 Eng. Rep. 962 (Ch. 1745),
and carried forward in Brown v. Cole, 14 LJ.-Ch. 167 (1845); see also Carpenter v. Winn,
39 Colo. App. 238, 566 P.2d 370 (1977).
124
14 LJ.-Ch. 167 (1845).
120
121

125

Id. at 168.

312

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:288

ing or re-employing the use of said prepaid principal." 126
2.

The Need for Predictable Returns on Investments

The creditor's concern with the predictability of the return on
its investments is a more frequently cited, and perhaps more economically significant, justification for the rule of perfect tender in
time.1 27 In Ellis v. Craig'2 8 the court predicated refusal to permit
prepayment upon the recognition that a loan requiring periodic interest payments reflects a conscious investment decision by the
creditor.1 29 The underlying assumption is that in a period of fluctuating interest rates creditors prefer a predictable return on their investments, one which could not be defeated by the debtor's
prepayment in the event of a decline in interest rates. When the
market interest rate declines, the debtor borrowing at fixed rates has
an incentive to refinance the debt, while the creditor has a corresponding incentive to protect its contractual interest rate. Indeed,
perhaps the most common justification given for prepayment penalties or charges is to "compensate the lender for the fact that the
loan does not run to maturity."' 30 Thus, the need to protect the
creditor's predictable rate of return against the likelihood that the
debtor will refinance the debt if interest rates fall justifies the rule of
perfect tender in time.' 3 1 If the creditor cannot demand payment of
126
Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Madorsky, 353 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1977), cert. denied, 359 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1978); see also Chestnut Corp. v. Bankers
Bond & Mortgage Co., 395 Pa. 153, 155-56, 149 A.2d 48, 50 (1959) ("A prepayment
clause is ordinarily inserted to compensate a mortgagee for the cost and expenses attendant in making a new long term mortgage loan.").
127
See Saunders v. Frost, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 259, 266 (1827) ("He [the creditor) had
a right to keep his money on interest according to the contract."); Kingman v. Pierce, 17
Mass. 247, 248 (1821) ("The promisee was entitled to interest, until the day agreed
upon for payment."); accord, Moore v. Cord, 14 Wis. 231 (1861).
128
7 Johns. Ch. 7 (N.Y. 1823).
129
The court contrasted notes specifying periodic interest payments with notes
which do not require payment of interest during the period of indebtedness. Id. at 12;
see supra note 90. This distinction, however, seems naive because many loans during the
early eighteenth century were heavily discounted in value upon issuance. Thus the
debtor received less than the face amount of the note. See, e.g., Savings Bank v. Bates, 8
Conn. 504 (1831). The amount of the discount was, in effect, a form of prepaid interest.
130
Westminster Investing Corp. v. Equitable Assurance Soc'y, 443 F.2d 653, 658
(D.C. Cir. 1970).
131
An example of a case where a debtor's prepayment would adversely affect the
creditor's financial investment is City of Portland v. Atlantic & St. L. R.R., 74 Me. 241
(1882). The city of Portland had loaned funds to the railroad, financing the loan by
issuing city bonds. Following extension of the loan and refinancing of the bonds by the
city, the railroad tendered the full amount of the debt plus accrued interest. In upholding the city's position that this was an ineffectual tender, the court stressed that if it
permitted prepayment, "the city must be a loser by the difference between the interest it
must pay and the interest it can obtain." Id. at 250. Evidently, prevailing interest rates
at the time of the attempted tender were lower than the stated rates in the debt instruments and the city's bonds were not "callable" by the city.
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the debt when market interest rates rise above the contract rate, the
debtor should not be able to prepay when market rates decline below the contract rates.132

However attractive this economic argument may seem as a matter of common sense, its application by courts has resulted in creditors' receiving far more than the effective anticipated yield on their
investments. Courts rarely attempt to calculate the economic cost
to the creditor of prepayment when market rates fall below the contract rate.1 33 Instead, some courts permit prepayment only when the
debtor tenders not only the outstanding principal and accrued interest, but also the interest which would have accrued as of the specified maturity date. 3 4 However, the amount of unaccrued interest
that the debtor must pay does not necessarily correlate to the creditor's actual economic loss. In addition, although an 1837 case suggests that tender of interest to the date of maturity is proper, 3 5
many courts state that even in these situations the creditor is not
obliged to accept prepayment.' 3 6 As recently as 1955 a court held
132
This article discusses the conceptual limits of the reciprocity argument in Part
II.B, infra notes 152-87 and accompanying text.
133 Presumably such a calculation would not be difficult for any given fixed-rate loan
with a specified maturity date or specified date upon which prepayment could be made
without penalty or charge. It would roughly equal the present value, as of the date of
prepayment, of the income stream over the remaining term of the contract of the
amount by which the contract rate of interest exceeded the market rate, as applied to the
principal repaid. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229, 1236
(S.D.N.Y. 1986).
If one wishes to factor in the creditor's original portfolio estimate of prepayment or
debt retirement, the calculation becomes significantly more complex. See infra notes
220-22 and accompanying text. This opinion, however, is clearly not shared by certain
courts. See, e.g., Lazzareschi Invest. Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal.
App. 3d 303, 309, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417, 421 (1971) ("prepayment case does not fall into a
simple calculation at any one point of time of the difference between the interest rate on
the repaid loan and that which might be available to the lending institution on a new
loan of about the same size made to a new borrower").
134 See Pedersen v. Fisher, 139 Wash. 28, 32, 245 P. 30, 32 (1926). The court noted,
No decision has come to our attention, and we think there is none, holding that an interest bearing contractual debt running for a fixed period
with interest covering the whole period, and with no provision in the contract for its payment by the debtor at his election before the end of such
period, may be paid by the debtor, except by consent of the creditor, other
than by tender of the principaland interestfor the whole time.
Id. (emphasis added). The argument that the creditor is not entitled to charge interest
for such period when the debt is fully paid because it was unearned has proven unsuccessful. See Wishnoff v. Guardian Say. & Loan Ass'n, 34 Ill. App. 3d 107, 110, 339
N.E.2d 494, 496 (1975) ("Earned interest is that to which the parties agree.").
135 Eaton v. Emerson, 14 Me. 335 (1837) (debtor tendered principal two days early,
together with interest through specified due date).
136 Abbe v. Goodwin, 7 Conn. 377 (1829); Moore v. Kime, 43 Neb. 517, 61 N.W.
736 (1895); Pyross v. Fraser, 82 S.C. 498, 64 S.E. 407 (1909); Brown v. Cole, 14 L.J.-Ch.
167 (1845); see also Duke v. Pugh, 218 N.C. 580, 581, 11 S.E.2d 868, 869 (1940) ("To
constitute a valid tender the offer must include the full amount the creditor is entitled to
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that even though the note expressly provided that the debtor "shall
have the right to pay off the balance due on the principal plus any
unpaid interest and thereby shall be permitted to retire the [debt]
without any penalty payment," the debtor must nonetheless pay all
interest which would have accrued as of the original maturity
date.

13 7

One would think that a creditor whose primary concern was the
predictability of the yield on its investment would gladly accept prepayment when prevailing market interest rates rise above the contract interest rate of an existing mortgage. Even in these situations,
however, courts have upheld a prepayment charge. In Westminster
Investing Corp. v. EquitableAssurance Society, 138 the debtor attempted to
prepay a debt of $5.7 million which had an interest rate of four and
one-half percent when prevailing market interest rates were at six
percent. The creditor refused to accept prepayment, and the court
ultimately sustained a prepayment charge of approximately
$50,000.139
3.

The Stability Provided by Regular Payments

In some situations the creditor is less concerned with protecting
the yield on its investments than with securing a series of regular
payments over a period of time. Several courts have relied upon the
specification of payments in equal monthly installments, with complete amortization of the debt over the full term of the monthly installments in concluding no prepayment was permitted. t40 These
receive, including interest to the date of tender."); Herrington v. Murphy, 446 P.2d 595

(Okla. 1968) (creditor may refuse tender of principal plus full year's interest only six
months after date of loan). But cf. Shope v. Rodenhaver, 90 Pa. Super. 353 (1927)
(promissory note expressly permitted prepayment upon tender of principal, accrued interest, and interest to maturity); Pedersen v. Fisher, 139 Wash. 28, 245 P. 30 (1926)
(suggestion in dicta that a debtor could prepay with interest to maturity).
137
Edge v. Bice, 263 Ala. 273, 274, 82 So. 2d 252, 253 (1955). But see Fortson v.
Burns, 479 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Ct. App. 1972) (court rejected mortgagee's argument that
even though note expressly permitted prepayment at any time without penalty, mortgagor must tender principal and interest through anticipated maturity date).
138 443 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir. 1970). At the time of prepayment, the loan had been
outstanding for 12 years, with the outstanding principal balance reduced from an initial
loan amount of $8 million to $5.7 million. The note permitted the debtor to prepay
commencing in the fourth year with the prepayment charge of three percent, declining
one-quarter of a percent each year thereafter. Id. at 658.
139
Id. at 658. The court stated, "It may well have been somewhat of a windfall for
Equitable to have received the principal amount before the running of the term of the
mortgage, given the higher interest rates then prevailing, but we should not take that
into account in interpreting this contract." Id.
140
See, e.g., Hensel v. Cahill, 179 Pa. Super. 114, 116 A.2d 99 (1955); Beth-June, Inc.
v. Wil-Avon Merchandise Mart, 211 Pa. Super. 5, 233 A.2d 620 (1967) (dicta). The
emergence early in the twentieth century of promissory notes in which the debt was fully
amortized in equal installments of principal and interest may have influenced these
conclusions.
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situations may involve a creditor who has made the loan in anticipation of receiving payments analogous to an annuity.' 4 1 Similarly,
prepayment of a mortgage may have disadvantageous tax consequences for a seller who has financed the sale of property through a
mortgage. 14 2 Many of the cases which have embraced most strongly
the rule of perfect tender in time involved attempts by purchasers of
land under installment sales contracts to compel conveyance of the
land prior to the date specified for conveyance. 143 In these situations, however, technically there is no mortgage involved because
the seller does not transfer title until the purchaser completes payment in accordance with the contract. Courts justify forbidding prepayment in these cases on two grounds: (1) the seller under an
installment sales contract frequently contemplates using the underlying property as security for other loans pending completion of the
installment period; and (2) the seller may lack clear title to the prop44
erty at the time of execution of the sales contract.
4. The Maximization of Yield
A creditor's desire to maximize yield beyond the contractual interest rate is protected by courts under the doctrine of freedom of
contract. Creditors argue that they are entitled to retain whatever
prepayment charges or fees are specified in the note and, absent
such specification, to garner whatever charges they choose to impose as conditions for accepting prepayment. 145 From this perspective, the size of the prepayment charge will not necessarily correlate
to the economic disadvantage a creditor incurs when a debtor refinances to take advantage of lower interest rates. Rather, the size of
the prepayment charge will be determined by what the market will
bear. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently suggested when
141 Cf. Lindsay Realty Corp. v. Bellina, 320 So. 2d 572 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (seller's
desire for annuity provided by seller-financed debt repayment was material term of real
estate listing).
142
See, e.g., Williams v. Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 13, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545, 549
(1980) ("a 50 percent prepayment penalty is valid if the penalty is reasonably related to
the obligee's anticipated risk of incurring increased tax liability"); cf. Henderson v.
Guest, 197 Okla. 443, 172 P.2d 605 (1946) (amount of prepayment treated as ordinary
income by seller-creditor).
143
See, e.g., Hanson v. Fox, 155 Cal. 106, 99 P. 489 (1909); Carpenter v. Winn, 39
Colo. App. 238, 566 P.2d 370 (1977); Reed v. Rudman, 5 Ind. 409 (1854); Barrell v.
Britton, 252 Mass. 504, 148 N.E. 134 (1925); Peryer v. Pennock, 95 Vt. 313, 115 A. 105
(1921).
144
See Nelson & Whitman, Installment Lands Sales Contracts-The National Scene Revisited, 1985 B.Y.U. L. REv. 1.
145
See e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229, 1231
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (creditor arguing for enforcement of note's "default prepayment premium"); Grissom v. Dye, 269 P.2d 367, 370 (Okla. 1953) (creditor arguing for "bonus"
in consideration for accelerating payment of note).
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recognizing a mortgagee's right to refuse to release its lien, "Having
a good investment that did not require acceptance of prepayment, it
could use market tactics to exact a profit. Our entrepreneurial economic system does not exact moral scruples in deals between parties
of equal bargaining power."' 4 6 Assuming a competitive market for
mortgages and low transactions costs, the rule of perfect tender in
time is one method of allowing creditors to maximize the yield on
their investments. 147
Under the four rationales listed above, courts permit refusal of
prepayment by applying the default rule of perfect tender in time:
when the mortgage instrument does not address the prepayment issue, the creditor's refusal to accept prepayment is justified in economic terms. In a fifth and more common situation, the mortgage
instrument itself permits a limited right of prepayment. In the overwhelming majority of residential mortgages issued during this century, the underlying note expressly permits prepayment of twenty
percent of the outstanding principal in any one year without
surcharge.' 4 8 In nonresidential mortgages, however, there has been
a wide variety of prepayment penalties and surcharges. t 49
Debtors argue that the enforcement of prepayment charges creates an effective interest rate far above the rate permitted by state
usury laws. These challenges have been uniformly unsuccessful.
Courts give two reasons for denying these challenges. First, if repayment of the debt in anticipated installments does not violate the
146 Houston N. Hosp. Properties v. Telco Leasing, 680 F.2d 19, 22-23 (5th Cir.
1982).
By extending this argument, apparently a creditor could insist upon a clause in
147
the promissory note absolutely prohibiting prepayment during the term of indebtedness. Such a provision has been held not to be an unreasonable restraint on alienation.
Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Randall, 283 Or. 297, 583 P.2d 1126 (1978); see also notes 17779 and accompanying text.
148 See infra notes 188-92 and accompanying text on the impact of Federal Home
Loan Bank Board regulations on residential mortgage prepayment clauses.
149 Some mortgages phrase the prepayment penalty as a number of additional
months of interest; they typically charge 6-12 months' interest. See, e.g., Lazzareschi Inv.
Co. v. San Francisco Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 22 Cal. App. 3d 303, 99 Cal. Rptr. 417
(1971) (6 months' interest); Century Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Madorsky, 353 So. 2d
868 (Fla. 1977) (12 months' interest); Berenato v. Bell Say. & Loan Ass'n, 276 Pa.
Super. 599, 419 A.2d 620 (1980) (12 months' interest).
Other penalties are phrased in terms of a percentage of the outstanding principle.
See, e.g., Westminster Inv. Corp. v. Equitable Assurance Soc'y, 443 F.2d 653 (D.C. Cir.
1970) (3% of any amount in excess of $500,000, declining one quarter percent each
loan year thereafter); LandOhio Corp. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Mortgage & Realty
Inv., 431 F. Supp. 475 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (3.5% of outstanding balance); Williams v.
Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1980) (50% prepayment penalty on any
amounts prepaid during first five years of loan); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hilander, 403
S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1966) (3% balance); Rosenfeld v. Savings Bank, 17 Misc. 667, 17
N.Y.S.2d 652 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd sub nom. In re Rosenfeld, 259 A.D. 1025, 21 N.Y.S.2d 158
(1940) (1% upon 30 days notice of prepayment).
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usury limitation, then accelerated repayment with a premium does
not constitute usury.' 5 0 Second, the debtor's decision to pay a prepayment charge is a voluntary decision to reduce the term of the
debt and amounts to a novation by which the creditor and debtor
enter into a new agreement which terminates the prior one. 15 1
Economic motivations for the rule of perfect tender in time provide justifications which .appeal to one's common sense when examined in isolated fact situations. These justifications, however,
occasionally lead to results that are inconsistent with their stated
economic motivations. At best this rule of law responds imperfectly
to its determinative forces; at worst, it creates significant inequities
for debtors seeking to free their property from an encumbrance.
B.

The Philosophical Justification: Reciprocity

Since at least the early nineteenth century, courts have used
forms of reciprocity between debtor and creditor as a theoretical
justification for the rule of perfect tender in time.' 5 2 "A creditor can
no more be compelled to accept payments on a contract before, by
the terms thereof, they are due, than can a debtor be compelled to
make such payments before they are due."'' 5 3
Cases throughout the rest of the nineteenth century carried forward this formalistic approach. 15 4 Just as with much of contract law,
the precise language of the instruments took on a magical quality,
150 Savannah Sav. Bank v. Logan, 99 Ga. 291, 25 S.E. 692 (1896) (where a debt with
both principal and interest due by installments paid according to terms of contract is
free from usury, transaction is not rendered usurious by voluntary payment of debt in
full before some installments matured although as a result creditor would receive, in
aggregate, sum amounting to more than principal plus maximum legal rate of interest);
accord Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Wolf, 54 A.2d 641 (D.C. 1947); Eldred v. Hart, 87 Ark.
534, 113 S.W. 213 (1908).
151 Feldman v. Kings Highway Say. Bank, 278 A.D. 589, 589-90, 102 N.Y.S.2d 306,
307, aft'd, 303 N.Y. 675, 102 N.E.2d 835 (1951) (payment of additional amount to obtain discharge early was "for the making of a new and separate agreement ....
[I]t was
not a payment of interest and therefore could not be the basis of a claim of usury."); see
also French v. Mortgage Guar. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 26, 104 P.2d 655 (1940); Williams v.
Fassler, 110 Cal. App. 3d 7, 167 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1980); Marley v. Consolidated Mortgage
Co., 120 R.I. 200, 229 A.2d 608 (1967); Bearden v. Tarrant Sav. Ass'n, 643 S.W.2d 247
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982). The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7 (1982), preempted state usury limitations for residential first mortgage loans. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has, however, construed
the Act narrowly as not preempting state laws on prepayment charges. See 12 C.F.R
§ 590.4(c) (1986); see also infra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
152 E.g., City of Portland v. Atlantic & St. L. R.R., 74 Me. 241, 250 (1882) ("A creditor cannot enforce the payment of a debt before its maturity. A debtor cannot compel
his creditor to receive his debt before it is due. The rights of the parties are equal and
reciprocal.").
153 Peryer v. Pennock, 95 Vt. 313, 315, 115 A. 105, 105 (1921).
154 E.g., Pyross v. Fraser, 82 S.C. 498,499, 64 S.E. 407,407 (1909) (to compel creditor to accept prepayment "would be to change the contract of the parties").
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The debtor as well as the creditor may benefit from such an approach. Thus, even though a promissory note requires specific periodic payments, if the note provides that the debt shall be paid "on
or before" a date certain, courts have held that this langauge entitles the debtor to pay the indebtedness prior to the date certain. 155
Courts reach the same result when the instrument specifies payment
"in" or "within" a certain period. 15 6 Monthly payments of "at least"
a specified amount' 57 and "not less than" a certain amount' 58 have
similarly been construed by courts to grant a prepayment privilege.
However, a clause in the promissory note adding the words "if not
sooner paid," does not unequivocally grant a right of prepayment.159
The extent to which courts have sought a right of prepayment
within the seemingly innocuous words of promissory notes illus60
trates the practical limitations of rigid contract theory analysis.'
155
Tryon v. Carter, 94 Eng. Rep. 1069 (K.B. 1734); Brent v. Fenner, 4 Ark. 160, 161
(1842) ("[W]hen a note is payable on or before a particular day, the obligor, by the
terms of the contract, reserves to himself the right to discharge the debt at any time
before the day named."); Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Wilson, 181 Cal. 616, 185 P. 853
(1919); Garner v. Sisson Properties, 198 Ga. 203, 31 S.E.2d 400 (1944); State ex rel.
Elliot v. Ratzburg, 215 La. 295, 40 So. 2d 395 (1949); Fortson v. Bums, 479 S.W.2d 722
(Tex. Ct. App. 1972); cf. Bradford v. Thompson, 470 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1971) (words
"on or before" permit surplus paid at due date for one installment to be applied against
the subsequent installment), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972); accord, Ballard-Hassett Co.
v. City of Des Moines, 207 Iowa 1351, 224 N.W. 793 (1929) (provision in municipal
bond for payment on specified date "or at any time prior thereto" authorizes municipality's redemption of bond prior to date specified); In reJohn and Cherry Sts., 19 Wend.
659, 13 N.Y. Com. L. Rpts. 741 (1839) (words "at or before" confer right to prepay).
But see Herrington v. Murphy, 446 P.2d 595 (Okla. 1968) (words "on or before" do not
permit prepayment on other than installment dates when note specifies payments in
installments).
156
Buffum v. Buffum, 11 N.H. 451 (1841) ("within one year"); Schotte v. Meredith,
138 Pa. 165, 20 A. 936 (1890) ("within ten years"); Horstman v. Gerker, 49 Pa. 282
(1865) (payable in five years). But see Hensel v. Cahill, 179 Pa. Super. 114, 116 A.2d 99
(1955) (where mortgage specified monthly payments of set amount, term "within fifteen
years" did not confer prepayment right).
157 E.g., Brenner v. Neu, 28 Ill. App. 2d 219, 222, 170 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1960) (language of payments in equal monthly installments "of at least $80.00 each.., obviously
grants a prepayment privilege to the maker or mortgagor").
158 E.g., Peters v. Fenner, 294 Minn. 488, 199 N.W.2d 795 (1972). Notes which
permit additional payments in multiples of certain amounts at the dates for regular installment payments have also been construed to permit full prepayment on those dates.
Security State Bank v. Waterloo Lodge No. 102, 85 Neb. 255, 122 N.W. 992 (1909).
159 Compare Beth-June, Inc. v. Wil-Avon Merchandise Mart, 211 Pa. Super. 5, 233
A.2d 620 (1967) (words "if not sooner paid" confer prepayment privilege on debtor)
with Bloomfield Say. Bank v. Stainton, 60 N.J. Super. 524, 159 A.2d 443 (1960) ("if not
sooner paid" applies only to final payment). The effect of Bloomfteld's holding was subsequently modified by statute. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
160
Courts utilizing formalistic contract theory have occasionally demonstrated a
stunning lack of flexibility. For example, some courts have sustained a refusal of tender
when the tender was not precisely the amount due. See Duke v. Pugh, 218 N.C. 580, 11
S.E.2d 868 (1940) (amount tendered insufficient in the amount of $1.25); Rolfe v. Pa-
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Judicial willingness to justify prepayment based on subtle contractual language destroys the reciprocity between debtor and creditor-the debtor has the right to prepay, but the creditor must wait
to be paid. 16 1 Thus these mortgages are not reciprocal in terms of
early nineteenth-century prepayment doctrine. They continue to be
reciprocal, however, in terms of sixteenth- through eighteenth-century doctrine: the debtor has a right to have his property freed of
the encumbrance upon payment of the debt, and the creditor has a
16 2
right to receive his investment.
The nineteenth-century reciprocity rationale encounters additional obstacles when the debt is payable on demand. In this situation, the debtor presumably could pay the debt at will. Yet, in Noyes
v. Wyckoff, the New York Court of Appeals held that even though the
debt was payable on demand, tender of the debt by a subsequent
purchaser of the property was ineffective because the creditor did
not demand payment and the original debtor did not make the
63
tender.1
The philosophical justification of reciprocity is also tested when
the debtor's early tender of all or part of the debt does not arise
solely from circumstances within the debtor's control. This occurs
when (1) mortgaged property is taken through eminent domain,
(2) insurance proceeds are applied upon casualty loss, or (3) the
creditor exercises a contractual right to accelerate the indebtedness.
The reciprocity rationale justifies the result reached only in the third
situation, and even there the result has not been uniform.
1.

Taking by Eminent Domain

When property which is security for a mortgage is taken in an
eminent domain proceeding, two substantive questions arise controns Androscoggin Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 106 Me. 345, 76 A. 879 (1909) (amount ten-

dered insufficient in amount of S.09).
161 This lack of reciprocity is recognized, but not considered dispositive, in State ex
rel. Elliot v. Ratzburg, 215 La. 295, 40 So. 2d 395 (1949).

162

The role of equity developed most clearly in situations involving the validity of

tender after breach of condition-the context for the equity of redemption. In the pe-

riod of transformation, courts recognized that if a grace period is allowed after breach of
the condition, the same principle should apply before breach of the condition. For example in 1841, the Superior Court ofJudicature of New Hampshire noted,
By the law of this state, grace is allowed on promissory notes. Upon

a note payable at one year from date, no suit can be commenced until the
expiration of the days of grace. But it is supposed that the maker may
tender at the expiration of the year, or at any time within the days of
grace. If he may, there is no objection, in point of principle, to a note by
which the maker any tender the money before the holder can make presentment and demand.
Buffum v. Buffum, 11 N.H. 451, 457 (1841).
163 114 N.Y. 204, 21 N.E. 158 (1889).
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cerning the creditor's right to part or all of the compensation award.
First, may the creditor demand immediate application of the funds
towards the outstanding principal debt? Second, is the creditor entitled to insist upon a prepayment charge if one is specified in the
note? In response to the creditor's argument that the eminent domain proceeding impairs the security for the debt, the majority of
cases have held that the creditor is entitled to a portion of the condemnation proceeds.' 64 It is not as clear, however, whether the
creditor or debtor can insist that the funds be applied immediately
to reduce the debt notwithstanding the fact that the underlying
promissory note provides neither a prepayment right nor a right of
the creditor to demand payment at will. In these situations the reciprocity concept suggests that the creditor should not be able to insist upon immediate payment of the condemnation award to reduce
the debt. The creditor should instead be permitted to insist only
that the debtor provide substitute collateral with the funds and that
it continue to make the payments specified in the note as they come
due. This has not been the result, however: even where the debt
was not due under the terms of the note, courts have permitted the
creditor to insist upon, and receive, the full amount of the condemnation award towards immediate reduction of the debt. 65 In these
situations the concept of reciprocity has not controlled; courts have
permitted the creditor to demand payment even though the debtor
See, e.g., Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1954); DeKalb County v.
United Family Life Ins. Co., 235 Ga. 417, 219 S.E.2d 707 (1975);Jala Corp. v. Berkeley
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 104 N.J. Super. 394, 250 A.2d 150 (1969). But see Harwell v. Georgia
Power Co., 250 Ga. 435, 298 S.E.2d 498 (1983) (equity requires apportionment of condemnation award between mortgagor and mortgagee inasmuch as costs of challenging
condemnation fall upon mortgagor); Investors Syndicate v. Dade County, 98 So. 2d 889
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (where part but not all of mortgaged property is taken in
condemnation action, mortgagee is entitled only to pro rata portion based upon percentage of property taken).
165
E.g., Adams v. Taylor, 253 N.C. 411, 117 S.E.2d 27 (1960). In Adams the mortgagor demanded that the mortgagee use the condemnation award to discharge the
monthly payments as they came due. The mortgagee insisted that while the award
should be applied towards the indebtedness, the mortgagor should be required to make
the same monthly payments originally agreed upon, only for a shorter period of time.
Upon the mortgagor's nonpayment of the monthly payments, the mortgagee foreclosed.
The trial court held that the funds should have been applied towards the monthly payments as they came due. On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that
because "neither debtor nor creditor had a right to direct the manner in which the payment should be used, it became the duty of the court to direct application so as to accord
with 'intrinsic justice or the equity of the case.' " Id. at 413, 117 S.E.2d at 29 (quoting
Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Clay County, 213 N.C. 698, 709, 197 S.E. 603, 610
(1938)). The court determined that intrinsic justice required that the mortgagor apply
the award in partial retirement of the debt and that the original term of the note remain
the same: it reduced the monthly payment amount to reflect amortization of the remaining debt over its original term.
164
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could not prepay.' 66
Courts disagree as to whether a creditor is entitled to a prepayment charge from condemnation proceeds. Some courts have refused to enforce a prepayment charge because the prepayment was
not voluntary. 167 Other courts have suggested in dicta that they
would enforce a prepayment charge in a condemnation situation if
the underlying promissory note expressly permitted a prepayment
charge.16 8 In these situations, the reciprocity concept should permit
the creditor to collect the prepayment charge if indeed the debtor
has the right to prepay, but courts do not always reach this conclusion. Thus the concept of reciprocity has proved to be of little force
or value when applied to mortgage prepayment in the event of condemnation. Courts have ignored the concept of reciprocity when it
should have been applied-in deciding whether the creditor can demand the funds immediately or obtain the funds only as the regular
payments come due-and have misapplied the concept of reciprocity when it should have been irrelevant-in situations where the
note contained an express prepayment charge.
2.

Insurance Proceeds Upon Casualty Loss

Insurance proceeds from casualty losses raise similar questions:
(1) whether the creditor can apply the proceeds to reduce the outstanding debt (again, with an impairment of the security argument),
and (2) whether the creditor can insist that the debtor pay a prepayment charge out of the insurance proceeds. As to the first question,
there has been a sharp division of opinion. In Thorpe v. Croto, 169 a
mortgage secured six $200 promissory notes payable in six successive years, with interest payable annually. Prior to the due date on
the first note a fire destroyed improvements covered by the mortgage. The insurance company paid the $247.50 proceeds to the
mortgagee, who applied them to satisfy the principal debt of the first
note. Prior to the due dates of any of the notes, the creditor filed for
foreclosure for nonpayment of interest. The debtor argued that the
creditor could not rightfully apply the proceeds to a debt not yet
166

E.g., In re John and Cherry Sts., 19 Wend. 659, 13 N.Y. Com. L. Rpts. 741

(1839).
167 Associated Schools, Inc. v. Dade County, 209 So. 2d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1968); DeKaIb County v. United Family Life Ins. Co., 235 Ga. 417, 219 S.E.2d 707
(1975). In somejurisdictions statutes expressly prohibit prepayment charges in the context of eminent domain. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 57 (West 1977)
(prepayment charge unenforceable when prepayment results from taking of property for
any public purpose).
168 LandOhio Corp. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. & Realty Inv., 431 F. Supp. 475
(N.D. Ohio 1976);Jala Corp. v. Berkeley Say. & Loan Ass'n, 104 NJ. Super. 394, 250

A.2d 150 (1969).
169 79 Vt. 390, 65 A. 562 (1907).
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due without the debtor's consent. The court agreed with the
debtor, holding that the creditor "had no right to apply the money
as he did, but that he should have held it until a part of the mortgage debt fell due, and then should have applied it to the part which
had fallen due, and as it fell due."' 7 0 In effect, this ruling turned the
insurance proceeds into a fund from which the creditor could draw
to meet debt and interest payments as they came due. The lengthy
and well-reasoned dissent did not argue that the creditor could have
applied the funds on receipt to the debt; it argued that the insurance
17 1
proceeds constituted "security in place of the property burned"
and that the creditor was neither obligated to draw upon the funds
to meet required payments nor permitted to apply the funds to the
principal debt. Instead, the dissent suggested, the funds constituted
replacement security which the creditor could reach only upon default by the debtor.
Under the nineteenth-century concept of reciprocity, the presence of the insurance proceeds should not have altered the relationship between the parties. The Thorpe dissent's reasoning is
consistent with this theory. Though there is dictum in other cases
which supports the Thorpe dissent, 17 2 courts that have dealt with this
question either permit the creditor to apply the insurance proceeds
immediately to reduce the debt or require that the creditor apply
173
the proceeds as the debt becomes due.
170
171

Id. at 393-94, 65 A. at 562.
Id. at 406-07, 65 A. at 567 (Miles, J., dissenting).

Holding money received on an insurance policy in place of the mortgaged property destroyed, is the exercise of a right by the mortgagee
derived from the terms of the mortgage, and his right to that money in no
way differs from the right which he had in the property which that money
represents, except that, being changed to personal property, possession,
in some cases, is necessary in order to protect his right as against third
parties; but when a breach of the condition of the mortgage happens, in
law, he becomes the absolute owner of the undestroyed part of the mortgaged property and also of the money which represents the part destroyed. He becomes such owner not because the money and property
are received as a payment, but because by the terms of the mortgage contract he is to become such on failure of the mortgagor to pay the mortgage debt when due.
Id. The dissent recognized that creditor and debtor could by agreement apply the funds
in any way they desired.
172
See, e.g., Gordon v. Ware Say. Bank, 115 Mass. 588, 591 (1874) ("To the mortgagee [the insurance] was for protection of the security, not for payment of the debt. It
was collateral to the debt. Money received from the insurance took the place of the
property destroyed, and was still collateral until applied in payment by mutual consent,
or by some exercise by the mortgagee of the right to demand payment of the debt, and
upon default, to convert the securities."); accord Pedersen v. Fisher, 139 Wash. 28, 33,
245 P. 30, 32 (1926) ("insurance is only security for the payment of the mortgage indebtedness and interest at the times agreed upon, and is not a fund from which the
creditor is required to take full payment" of debt before it is due).
173
A court will enforce a provision expressly granting the mortgagee the right to
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Whether a creditor can extract a prepayment charge from insurance proceeds has depended primarily upon the terms of the underlying note. In one case, the promissory note specified a prepayment
privilege upon payment of a two percent surcharge.1 74 After fire
destroyed the mortgaged premises, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied the creditor's claim for the prepayment charge. The
court recognized that the prepayment charge may have been intended to compensate the creditor for the transaction costs of making a new loan, but compared this to the debtor's loss of its
improvements and resulting economic losses. With little analysis,
the court concluded, "In such a situation both parties suffer, but the
owner suffers most.

' 175

Significantly, the court suggested that it

would enforce a clause expressly providing for a prepayment charge
even upon prepayment of the debt through insurance proceeds.
3. Acceleration of Indebtedness
The reciprocity concept is pushed to its logical extreme when
the creditor has by virtue of its rights under the security documents
accelerated the entire debt. In this situation is the creditor entitled
to demand a prepayment charge? The reciprocity rationale suggests
that because the lender voluntarily exercises its contractual option
to accelerate instead of simply insisting upon each payment as it
comes due, the lender should not be entitled to a prepayment
charge.1 76 The cases, however, have split on this point, with little
consensus as to reasoning or result. Some courts have concluded
that the creditor cannot insist upon a prepayment charge when the
creditor has elected to accelerate, because the prepayment is not
voluntary on the part of the debtor.' 77 Other courts have permitted
apply insurance proceeds toward the outstanding debt notwithstanding the mortgagor's
arguments that the insurance proceeds should apply to restoration or rebuilding, or that
the mortgagor would incur significantly higher costs in obtaining a new mortgage at
higher interest rates. Giberson v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 329 N.W.2d 9 (Iowa
1983).
174
Chestnut Corp. v. Bankers Bond & Mortgage Co., 395 Pa. 153, 149 A.2d 48
(1959).
175
Id. at 156, 149 A.2d at 50.
176
In Peter Fuller Enters. v. Manchester Sav. Bank, 102 N.H. 117, 152 A.2d 179
(1959), the debtor intentionally defaulted on monthly payments and insisted that the
default automatically accelerated the indebtedness. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the default clause was not self-operative, and that the creditor could
either accelerate the indebtedness or insist upon payments as they became due. Id. at
121, 152 A.2d at 181.
177
See In re LHD Realty Corp., 726 F.2d 327, 331 (7th Cir. 1984) (mortgagee forfeits
right to prepayment premium by exercising option to accelerate debt); Doering v.
Schneider, 74 Ind. App. 294, 128 N.E. 936 (1920) (if mortgagee has taken steps to declare default, or foreclose upon security, then mortgagee has waived right to insist upon
payments in accordance with note); Kilpatrick v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 183 N.Y. 163,
75 N.E. 1124 (1905) (action by creditor commencing foreclosure rendered debt due,
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a surcharge when the creditor accelerates the debt,1 78 or when the
creditor has threatened default and acceleration and the debtor subsequently tenders payment of the outstanding indebtedness and ac1 79
crued interest.
In 1985 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) issued
regulations which expressly prohibit a creditor from insisting upon
a prepayment charge when the creditor has invoked or threatened
to invoke its rights under a due-on-sale clause to accelerate repayment of the debt.' 8 0 In 1983, the FHLBB had removed all substanthus payment of debt was not voluntary and creditor was not entitled to prepayment
"bonus"); Nutman v. Aetna Business Credit, 115 Misc. 2d 168, 453 N.Y.S.2d 586 (Sup.
Ct. 1982) (after electing to accelerate mortgage due to default, mortgagee may not exact
prepayment penalty); Grissom v. Dye, 269 P.2d 367 (Okla. 1953) (when mortgagee declares default and accelerates full indebtedness, demand is for actual principal and interest then due, thus mortgagee has no right to insist on prepayment charge); see also infra
note 187 and accompanying text. But cf Baltimore Life Ins. v. Ham, 15 Ariz. App. 78,
81, 486 P.2d 190, 193 (1971) (court, in dicta, expressly reserved question).
178
See Savannah Say. Bank v. Logan, 99 Ga. 291, 25 S.E. 692 (1896) (finding voluntary payment by debtor, even as to unearned interest where mortgagee declared default,
threatened foreclosure, and insisted on full payment of debt); Pedersen v. Fisher, 139
Wash. 28, 245 P. 30 (1926) (mortgagee entitled to full amount of principal and interest
due on date of decree where mortgagor defaulted on interest payment and mortgagee
accelerated and foreclosed)
A promissory note which contains a "lock-in" feature prohibiting prepayments entirely during part or all of the loan period may create a perverse incentive for the debtor
to default intentionally on its obligations and thereby force the creditor to declare a
default and accelerate the entire indebtedness. Such acceleration, however, is usually
specified in the note to be at the creditor's option. See Peter Fuller Enters. v. Manchester
Say. Bank, 102 N.H. 117, 152 A.2d 179 (1959). Some promissory notes expressly provide for a "default prepayment premium" to cover such an event. See Teachers Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n v. Butler, 626 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
The combination of a due-on-sale clause or lock-in clause together with a clause
which provides for a prepayment charge even when the creditor accelerates the debt
may strengthen the debtor's argument that the clauses constitute an unenforceable restraint on alienation. See Sonny Arnold, Inc. v. Sentry Say. Ass'n, 633 S.W.2d 811, 818
(Tex. 1982) (Spears,J., concurring). But see Casey v. Business Men's Assurance Co., 706
F.2d 559 (5th Cir. 1983) (10 year lock-in provision together with due-on-sale clause
does not constitute unreasonable restraint on alienation). For a discussion of prepayment penalties in the context of due-on-sale clauses see infra note 187 and accompanying text.
179
See West Portland Dev. Co. v. Ward Cook, Inc., 246 Or. 67, 424 P.2d 212 (1967)
(upholding 3% prepayment surcharge where mortgagee declared default and full acceleration on May 9th, parties executed rescission of notice of default on May 27th; and 10
days later debtor sought to prepay entire balance because no evidence that debtor relied
upon acceleration prior to waiver thereof); Cook v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 143
Wash. 145, 254 P. 834 (1927) (actions threatening foreclosure not held waivers of prepayment charge on grounds that foreclosure was at mortgagor's option where mortgagee threatened foreclosure, parties negotiated out by pledge of rentals, and thereafter
mortgagor sought to prepay, but bank insisted on prepayment penalty expressly provided in note); see also Mutual Life Ins. v. Hilander, 403 S.W.2d 260 (Ky. 1966) (upholding creditor's demand for 3% prepayment penalty); Berenato v. Bell Say. & Loan Ass'n,
276 Pa. Super. 599, 419 A.2d 620 (1980) (prepayment by liquidator held enforceable
where sale was due to failure of mortgagor's business).
180
12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2) (1986), 50 Fed. Reg. 46,749 (1985); see infra notes 188-
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tive limitations on prepayment charges in residential mortgages. 18 '
The initial regulations proposed in 1983 carried forward a previous
prohibition on prepayment changes when the lender exercises a
due-on-sale clause; in the final regulations, however, the FHLBB removed even this prohibition.' 82 Nonetheless, within sixty days the
FHLBB did an abrupt about-face and reinstated its prohibition on
prepayment fees when the lender has invoked a due-on-sale
clause. 183 One year later the FHLBB found it necessary to propose
a new regulation strengthening this prohibition when it discovered
lenders were refusing to permit mortgage assumptions by purchasers and threatening invocation of due-on-sale clauses, then charging
prepayment fees upon prepayment on the grounds that the due-onsale clause had not actually been invoked. 184 Following an unusually long period for public comment on the proposed regulations,
the FHLBB issued final regulations in November 1985 which prohibit a lender from charging a prepayment fee where the lender refuses to permit a purchaser of the property to assume the
mortgage.' 8 5 In an extensive explanatory ruling, the FHLBB concluded that it is inequitable to permit a lender to charge a prepayment fee if the lender, in effect, chooses to "call" the loan:
The implicit premise of the rule [prohibiting prepayment without
consent of the lender] is that the benefit of the bargain for the
lender is to have a credit worthy borrower obligated on the loan
for its stated term to maturity .... In the Board's opinion, equity
demands that no prepayment penalty be permitted if a lender
does not wish to allow a loan to remain outstanding by approving
its assumption by a qualified obligor.' 8 6
This FHLBB decision followed several recent state court opinions
and legislative enactments prohibiting prepayment charges under
94 and accompanying text for a summary of the evolution of the FHLBB's regulation of
prepayment charges.
181 48 Fed. Reg. 2373 (1983).
182
Id. at 21,563 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2) (1986)).
183
Id. at 32,162 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2) (1986)) ("A lender shall not
impose a prepayment penalty or equivalent fee for or in connection with acceleration of
the loan by exercise of a due-on-sale clause."). The Board identified three factors which
necessitated reversal of its position and reimposition of this limitation: (1) the possibility
of confusion and unnecessary litigation resulting from different state laws; (2) questions
as to whether the regulations preempt state law as to federal lenders, but not other
lenders; and (3) Congress's intent to create homogeneity in the secondary mortgage
market. 48 Fed. Reg. 32,161 (1983).
184
49 Fed. Reg. 32,081 (1984).
185
50 Fed. Reg. 46,749 (1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 591.5(b)(2) (1986).
186 50 Fed. Reg. 46,746 (1985) (citation omitted). Though written prior to the final
regulations' publication, a recent article anticipated FHLBB movement in this direction.
Comment, Prepayment PenaltiesAfter Garn-St. Germain:A Minor Coupfor Consumers, 3 DET. C.
L. REv. 835 (1985) (pointing out that while regulations resolve one question about enforcement of prepayment charges, many more questions remain unresolved).
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7

Thus, when addressing involuntary tenders involving condemnation awards and insurance proceeds, courts have abandoned reciprocity as a philosophical justification for the rule of perfect tender
in time. Only in the context of due-on-sale clauses and only after
several states and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board enacted prepayment prohibitions have courts consistently applied the reciprocity rationale.
C.

Statutory and Regulatory Intervention

With the advent of the long-term, fixed-rate mortgage during
the Depression, regulations promulgated by the Home Loan Bank
Board (HLBB), and its successor the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board (FHLBB), established standards for residential mortgage prepayment charges.' s8 The Home Loan Bank Board reversed the default rule of perfect tender in time and provided that if the note
failed to specify a prepayment restriction or charge, the debtor had
the right to prepay the debt without penalty. 1i 9 The regulations
also imposed a ceiling on prepayment charges. 19 The HLBB initially set the ceiling at a maximum of ninety days' interest on the
amount prepaid if the amount exceeded twenty percent of the original principal amount of the loan. The Board subsequently increased the ceiling to six months' interest, but retained the twenty
percent limitation.191 With minor changes, these provisions gov187 See, e.g., Slevin Container Corp. v. Provident Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 98 Ill. App.
3d 646, 648, 424 N.E.2d 939, 941 (1981) (when obligee accelerates, "the exercise...
renders the payment made . . . after maturity and by definition not prepayment");
Crockett v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 289 N.C. 620, 626-27, 224 S.E.2d 580, 585
(1976) (holding exercise of due-on-sale clause valid but prohibiting charge of prepayment penalty); American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Mid-America Serv. Corp., 329
N.W.2d 124 (S.D. 1983) (mortgagee not entitled to three month interest bonus upon
exercising due-on-sale clause); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Uresti, 553 S.W.2d
660, 663 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977) ("Once the maturity date is accelerated to the present, it
is no longer possible to prepay the debt before maturity."); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254a (McKinney Supp. 1986) (prohibiting prepayment fee upon exercise of due-on-sale
clause) (upheld against retroactivity challenge in Rogers v. Williamsburgh Say. Bank, 79
Misc. 2d 852, 361 N.Y.S.2d 531 (1974)); VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-330.33 (1983) (no prepayment penalty when lender accelerates under due-on-sale clause).
188 The HLBB and the FHLBB charters to savings and loans association set forth
clearly debtor prepayment rights and obligations. Charter K, 24 C.F.R. § 202.9(14)(b)
(1938).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191
16 Fed. Reg. 10,628 (1951) (codified at 24 C.F.R. § 145.6-12). This change resulted from an ambiguity in an amendment the prior year over whether the interest
penalty was applied to the entire amount of prepayment, or only to the prepayment in
excess of 20% of the original loan amount. See 15 Fed. Reg. 2,309 (1950) (codified at
24 C.F.R. § 145.6-12).
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erned residential mortgages from 1938 to 1983.192 In 1983, the
FHLBB eliminated all substantive regulations on prepayment
charges in fixed-rate mortgages, leaving only a requirement that the
existence and amount of any prepayment charge be fully disclosed
93
in the loan documents.'
In the last twenty years, states have begun to enact legislation
designed to prohibit prepayment charges and otherwise limit the
reach of the historic rule of perfect tender in time. New Jersey, for
example, in 1968 displaced the common-law rule by limiting prepayment charges during the first five years of a loan and prohibiting
them thereafter.' 94 In 1979 New Jersey amended the legislation to
19 5
prohibit entirely prepayment penalties in residential mortgages.
Other states have enacted legislation which substantially follows the
early FHLBB rules limiting maximum prepayment charges to three
to six months' interest. 19 In 1983 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
reversed the rule of perfect tender in time and established a presumption that where the loan documents are silent as to the right of
197
prepayment, the debtor may prepay the debt at any time.
The history of the American law of mortgage prepayment is pri192 In 1966 the FHLBB amended the regulations to limit specifically the restrictions
on prepayment charges to mortgages secured by homes or combinations of homes and
business property. 31 Fed. Reg. 7,508 (1966) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 145.6-12). The
FHLBB later narrowed the restrictions to borrower-occupied homes. 34 Fed. Reg.
12,025 (1969) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 546.6-12(b)); 44 Fed. Reg. 39,130 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 545.8-5(b)).
193
12 C.F.R. § 545.34(c) (1983). The FHLBB retained the default rule that, absent
an express prepayment charge, a debtor may prepay a loan without penalty. 12 C.F.R.
§ 555.15 (1983).
194 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-1-7 (West Supp. 1986) (codifying 1968 NJ. Laws 54).
This statute reversed the common-law rule reflected in Bloomfield Say. Bank v. Howard
Staunton & Co., 60 NJ. Super. 524, 159 A.2d 443 (App. Div. 1960).
195 NJ. STAT. ANN. § 46:10B-2 (1979). Similarly, Pennsylvania enacted a statute
prohibiting prepayment penalties in residential mortgages. 41 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 405 (Purdon Supp. 1985). The Pennsylvania statute, however, was preempted by
FHLBB regulations which permitted a prepayment charge, subject to maximum limitations, upon full disclosure. 12 C.F.R. § 555.15 (1976); see Toolan v. Trevose Federal
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 288 Pa. Super. 211, 431 A.2d 1012 (1981), aff'dmem, 501 Pa. 477,
462 A.2d 224 (1983); see also N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-30 (1986 Repl.) (prohibiting prepayment charges in residential mortgages).
196
See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 183, § 56 (Michie/Law. Coop. 1977). In contrast,
Illinois prohibits prepayment charges if the interest rate of the underlying note exceeds
8%o. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 17, § 6404(2)(a) (Smith-Hurd 1986). See generally G. NELSON &
D. WHrrMAN, supra note 20, at 430-32.
197
Mahoney v. Furches, 503 Pa. 60, 468 A.2d 458 (1983); see also Burks v. Versehuur, 35 Colo. App. 121, 123, 532 P.2d 757, 758 (1974) ("We hold that if a mortgagee
is to seek a premium or penalty upon prepayment, he must specifically provide therefore
in the mortgage instrument"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.06 (West Supp. 1986) ("Any note
which is silent as to the right of the obligor to prepay .

.

. in advance of the stated

maturity date may be prepaid in full by the obligor ... without penalty."). But see Carpenter v. Winn, 39 Colo. App. 238, 566 P.2d 370 (1977) (affirming perfect tender in
time requirement in context of installment sales contracts).
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marily that of the rule of perfect tender in time. The rule's economic justifications are diverse and frequently inconsistent and,
when embodied in a strict rule, create incongruous economic resuits. Similarly, the rule's philosophical justification is also unpersuasive because reciprocity between debtor and creditor is hardly a
necessary element of the debtor-creditor relationship and because
courts ignore reciprocity in condemnation and insurance proceeds
situations. The absence of persuasive justifications for the rule of
perfect tender in time has prompted a wide range of judicial and
legislative attempts to modify the rule. The federal government, by
contrast, has chosen to refrain from all substantive regulation on
this issue (with the narrow exception of prepayment penalties in the
context of due-on-sale clauses). Nonetheless, new economic forces
in the secondary mortgage market, and the probability of federal
preemption of mortgage law, increase the need for clarity in this
area.
Ill
THE FUTURE OF MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT

The law concerning prepayment rights and penalties in residential mortgages is less clear now than at any point since the early
nineteenth century. At the same time, the demand for residential
mortgages is greater than ever before. This demand will be met in
large part by the development and expansion of private sources of
capital in the secondary mortgage market. The secondary market,
in turn, creates pressure for uniformity and certainty in mortgage
transactions.1 98 These contemporary forces invite a comprehensive
reexamination of the role that prepayment charges play in residential finance. These new developments also provide an opportunity
to design rules of law which incorporate the equitable concerns that
have developed during the historical evolution of mortgage prepayment law.
A.

Emergence of the Secondary Mortgage Market

The private secondary mortgage market, created in 1970, has
rapidly become a primary source of funds for residential mortgages.
In 1983 a total of $89 billion was raised through the secondary
mortgage market, providing almost half of all funds for new home
198 On the development of standard mortgage loan documents for the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, see
Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interactionof Economics, Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397 (1972).
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mortgages that year. 19 9 In 1986 secondary market volume could
reach $225 billion. 20 0 Some observers have estimated that as of
1985 the total amount of mortgage debt outstanding in this country
was approximately $1.7 trillion; estimates of the additional mortgage demand for the next decade range from $3 to 4 trillion. 20 1
The secondary mortgage market consists of the post-origination purchase and sale of mortgage loan instruments. For most of
this century, residential loans were retained in portfolios by loan
originators who were generally savings and loan associations. Over
the last fifteen years, however, this practice has all but disappeared
because of two major economic developments. First, the widespread disintermediation which occurred during periods of high interest rates in the 1970s forced savings and loan associations to
locate a market for low yield portfolios. Second, demand for residential financing outstripped the combined ability of savings and
loan associations and federal agencies to provide funds. These two
factors combined to provide the impetus for a secondary mortgage
market to attract private capital to the residential finance
20 2
industry.
Since 1970 public trading of mortgage-backed securities has enabled investors to invest in a percentage ownership of a large pool
of residential mortgages. In 1970 the federal government took the
lead in the "securitization" of mortgages by issuing, through the
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA), the first publicly traded mortgage-backed security. 20 3 GNMA instruments permit investors to purchase an undivided interest in a pool of federally
insured mortgages. The private sector's first major issuance of
199

H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2dSess. 14, reprintedin 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &

NEws 2827, 2835.
276 The Bond Buyer 911, col. 3 (May 16, 1986) (statement of David 0. Maxwell,
chairman, Federal National Mortgage Association).
ADMIN.
200
201

K. LORE, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE

1-14 (Securities Law Series, 1986-87). Fifty-two
percent of all 1985 mortgage originations are held on the secondary market. Id. at 2-52.
See also Secondary Mortgage Market: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Community
Dev. of the House Comm. on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 289
(1984) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of William P. McCauley, First Boston Corp.) (estimating $1.7 trillion in outstanding mortgage debt as of 1985); id. at 262 (statement of
Lewis Ranieri, Salomon Brothers Inc.) (estimating demand for additional $3 trillion to
finance housing by 1995).
202
For the most comprehensive summary of the secondary mortgage market's origins and processes, see generally K. LORE, supra note 201. "The notion of transforming
mortgages to sell to a wider market is probably the most important housing finance
concept of the last fifteen years." Id. at 1-14; see also Malloy, The Secondary Mortgage Market-A Catalystfor Change in Real Estate Transactions, 39 Sw. LJ. 991 (1986).
SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 1-9,

203

For an overview of the GNMA securities market, see Miller, Regulation of Trading

in Ginnie Maes, 21 Duq. L.

REV.

39 (1982).

330

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:288

mortgage-backed securities was in 1977.204 Trade in privately issued mortgage-backed securities grew from $27 million in 1976 to
$4.7 billion in 1983,205 but federal agency issues continued to dominate the secondary mortgage market. 20 6 To meet projected housing finance needs, and to encourage a larger role for privately issued
mortgage-backed securities, Congress enacted the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984.207 This Act amended the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 and altered the authority of a
number of federal financial entities so as to eliminate restrictions
hampering the issuance of mortgage-related securities. Mortgagebacked bonds have also been issued on the secondary market. The
bonds represent a debt obligation of the issuer which is collateralized by a pool of mortgages. 20 8 The success of the secondary mortgage market is due in part to the examples set by GNMA, the
Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) during the 1970s and
in part to the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act.
The secondary market is economically successful because
(1) mortgage instruments are relatively standardized throughout the
country, (2) the market enables institutional investors to invest directly or indirectly in large mortgage pools instead of purchasing
and managing single real estate mortgages, and (3) it allows issuers
and investors to hedge against risks associated with individual mortgages by aggregating mortgages from different geographical areas.
Despite the overall success of the secondary mortgage market, the
question of mortgage prepayment continues to affect adversely the
viability of mortgage-backed securities.
Prepayment rights have a significant impact on the secondary
mortgage market. Allowing debtors to prepay their indebtedness at
will and without a premium or surcharge introduces uncertainty into
the underlying mortgage pool, which in turn destablizes the passthrough returns that the investors receive. Uncertainty about aggregate prepayment rates (whether due to voluntary prepayment or involuntary prepayment caused by a creditor's acceleration, eminent
domain, or casualty loss) makes the maturity of such investments
204
205

See K. LORE, supra note 201, at 1-4, 1-10.
Id. at 1-11.
206
See Hearing, supra note 201, at 91 (table 4).
207 Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984).
208
Numerous variations exist on mortgage-backed obligations. Examples include
pass-through certificates or bonds, in which the residential debtor's principal and interest payments are distributed to the investors; pay-through obligations, which are collateralized debt obligations of the issuer; and collateralized mortgage obligations, which
are variations on pay-through obligations issued in classes with different repayment priorities so as to offer investors a limited form of call protection. See generally K. LORE,
supra note 201, at 3-5 to 3-32; 1985 Secondary Mortgage Mkt. Guide (MB) §§ 7.01-.03.
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highly unpredictable. Because of this lack of "call protection," investors in mortgage-backed securities demand a higher yield on
their investments. 20 9 This demand, in turn, forces borrowers to pay
higher interests rates on residential mortgages. One financial manager in the secondary mortgage market has estimated that call protection through some form of prepayment penalty would reduce the
typical interest rate for individual home borrowers by as much as
one-half of one percentage point. 210 Congress recognized the seriousness of the mortgage prepayment problem and, in the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, charged the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to prepare
a study of the impact of mortgage prepayment on the secondary
mortgage market and to propose "federally standardized mortgage
211
instruments that would contain prepayment penalties."
There are three possible methods for providing investors with a
degree of call protection. The first alternative is simply to allow the
market to function freely, with issuers of mortgage-backed securities
purchasing only those mortgages having prepayment penalties if the
economic incentive to the ultimate investor is high enough. The
second alternative is to attempt to predict in advance prepayment
rates on given pools of mortgages and segregate the pools to meet
different investor concerns. The third option is to federally preempt prepayment rights and penalties in order to promote standardization and attract investors.
The obvious advantage of the free market approach is the absence of federal regulatory and statutory intervention in the secondary mortgage market. Issuers and investors would determine
through competition the most effective pricing mechanism for mortgage-backed securities. Several governmental policies, however,
render this approach unfeasible. As noted previously, a number of
states have recently restricted the enforceability of prepayment
charges in residential mortgages with laws differing markedly from
state to state. 2 12 The free market approach might be viable if the
209
K. LORE, supra note 201, at 1-48 to 1-50. In light of the significant jump in residential refinancings that occurred during the spring of 1986 following a sharp, general
decline in interest rates, one expert warned that the lack of call protection in mortgage
backed securities will create a "fiasco" in the market. "The market was never designed
to handle the refinancing of 50%o to 60%o of every [mortgage] that's ever been issued.... Everyone underestimated the cost of the lack of call protection ....
" 276 The
Bond Buyer 960, col. 3 (1986) (statement of Lewis Ranieri, Managing Director, Salomon
Brothers, Inc.).
210 Interview: Lewis S. Ranieri, Managing Director,Salomon Brothers, U.S. BANKER, Jan.
1985, 22, 26.
211
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-440,
§ 212, 98 Stat. 1689, 1697.
212
See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
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federal government were willing to allow residential mortgage funds
to flow to those states having the most favorable laws concerning
prepayment charges and away from those states restricting such
charges. But, as evidenced by its preemption of state laws on dueon-sale clauses, 21 3 Congress is not willing, as a matter of national
housing policy, to permit wide regional differences in the availability
of housing credit. Indeed, one of Congress's goals in creating the
secondary mortgage market was to reduce barriers to the interre2 14
gional flow of mortgage funds.
The second method for providing call protection to investors in
mortgage-backed securities is to predict prepayment rates and create separate classes of securities based on anticipated maturation.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board took this approach and in June
1983 issued a new variation on the mortgage-backed security: the
collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO). The CMO starts with
the traditional mortgage-backed security structure: the issuer creates a large pool of underlying mortgages to provide collateral for
its debt obligations. The CMO's distinctive characteristic is that its
securities are divided into classes: fast-pay, medium-pay, and slowpay. The cash flow from the underlying mortgages is allocated first
to the fast-pay class of bonds, second to the medium-pay class, and
finally to the slow-pay class. Each class carries a maximum maturity
and a predicted maturity based on the projected rate of mortgage
21 5
prepayment.
Though CMOs have met with a degree of success, their popularity is limited by the difficulty of determining mortgage prepayment rates. Until the turbulent economic period of the late 1970s,
mortgage prepayment tables compiled by the Federal Housing Administration were deemed accurate predictors of future rates; the
standard assumption was that the average life of a thirty-year fixedrate mortgage was twelve years.2 16 The FHA tables have proven to
be inaccurate predictors, however, and the Public Securities Association has recently promulgated a new mathematical model to predict prepayment rates and thereby evaluate the multiple classes of
securities in a CMO. 2 17 Even so, assumptions inherent in estimations of prepayment rates have a major impact on the ability of in213
12 C.F.R. § 591 (1983).
214 H.R. REP. No. 994, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2827, 2829.
215 See K. LORE, supra note 201, at 3-18 to 3-21; Maller, The Collateralized Mortgage
Obligation: The Latest Phase in the Evolution of Mortgage-Backed Securities, 13 REAL EST. LJ.
299 (1985); 1985 Secondary Mortgage Mkt. Guide (MB) § 7.02[2][c].
216

See

M. WALDMAN, THE NEXT STEP IN MORTGAGE SECURITY YIELDS: APPLYING THE

EXPERIENCE OF THE 1970s, at 4 (1981).
217 K. LORE, supra note 201, at 4-138, 4-143, 4-144.
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vestors to predict accurately CMO yields. 218
The yields on mortgage-backed securities, in the absence of
some form of call protection, are subject to two variables: general
market interest rates and prepayment rates. These two variables are
related in that prepayment rates increase as market rates decrease.
Recent studies indicate that the greatest degree of uncertainty in
prepayment rates occurs not, as one might expect, when large differences between contract rates and market rates exist, but when the
interest rate of the securities is at or near the market rate of interest
on new mortgages. 2 19 Regional differences in prepayment rates add
to the uncertainty. 220 Further, there is little consensus on the extent
to which prepayment penalties will provide either the necessary certainty about prepayment rates or the call protection sought by investors. 2 2 1 The lack of uniformity among state laws and mortgage
instruments continues to affect adversely prediction models for
mortgage prepayment rates. The market prices of CMO issues nec22 2
essarily reflect these uncertainties.
The third method for providing call protection for investors in
mortgage-backed securities is federal intervention. Such intervention could take the form of either a preemption of state laws on
mortgage prepayment which allows the market to set an efficient
prepayment charge or a substantive specification of a prepayment
218 Lore suggests that "[t]he thorniest issue, and the most critical, is the rate of prepayment, i.e., the prepayment assumptions used to project loan maturity. The range of
variables obviously remains a barrier to the marketability of the CMO; its 'peculiarities'
remain confusing to investors accustomed to corporate bonds." Id. at 2-42; see also Murray & Hadaway, Mortgage-BackedSecurities: An Investigation of Legal and FinancialIssues, 11 J.
CORP. L. 203, 247 (1986).
219

R. CLAYTON & S. GOLDSTEIN, PREPAYMENT IMPLICATIONS OF MORTGAGE-BACKED

SECURITY PRICES 5 (FHLBB Office of Policy and Economic Research Research Working
Paper No. 115, 1984). See generally Curley & Guttentag, Value and Yield Risk on Outstanding
InsuredResidentialMortgages, 32 J. FIN. 403 (1977); Dunn & Singleton, An EmpiricalAnalysis
of the Pricingof Mortgage-BackedSecurities, 38J. FIN. 613 (1983); Hendershott, Sheng Hu &
Villani, The Economics of Mortgage Terminations: Implicationsfor Mortgage Lenders and Mortgage Terms, 2 HOUSING FIN. REV. 127 (1983).
220
M. WALDMAN, H. PELTZ & N. LOWEN, REGIONAL DIFFERENCES IN MORTGAGE PREPAYMENTS: PREPAYMENT RATES BY STATE BY FHLMC AND FNMA POOLS (1984).
221
See Dunn & Spatt, An Analysis of Mortgage Contracting: Prepayment Penalties and the

Due-on-Sale Clause, 40 J. FIN. 293 (1985); F. NAVRATIL, THE ESTIMATION OF MORTGAGE
PREPAYMENT RATES (FHLBB Office of Policy and Economic Research Research Working
Paper No. 112, 1984).
222 Congress attempted to address some of the uncertainties confronting issuers of
CMOs by authorizing the creation of real estate mortgage investment conduits
("REMICs") in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 671(a)9.A, 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1, 225-34 (to be codified at 26 U.S.C. § 860A-G). REMICs
may issue multiple class collateralized mortgage obligations designed to stagger the prepayment rate among the various classes. Id. Whether REMICs may issue such obligations with adjustable (or "floating") interest rates is unclear, however, and this lack of
clarity has retarded their development thus far. 279 The Bond Buyer 204 (Jan. 16,
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charge (as was the case for most of this century). While federal preemption of residential finance law has occurred more frequently in
the last five years than at any point in our history, it is still not clear
whether preemption will extend to laws dealing with prepayment.
B.

Federal Preemption

In the wake of Fidelity FederalSavings and Loan Association v. De La
Cuesta,22 3 Congress enacted the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.224 Fidelity Federal held that FHLBB regulations
permitting savings and loan associations to include due-on-sale
clauses in mortgage documents preempted contrary state statutes
and judicial decisions. 22 5 Garn-St. Germain made this preemption
22 6
explicit and extended it to all loans.
Whereas the combination of Fidelity Federal and Garn-St.
Germain leaves little doubt that Congress can, if it so chooses, preempt all state laws concerning mortgage prepayment, whether the
FHLBB presently has such authority to preempt such state laws, or
whether it has in fact already done so, is not clear. Initially, the
FHLBB took the position that Gan-St. Germain authorized the preemption of state laws concerning due-on-sale clauses only, and not
laws pertaining to prepayment charges. 2 27 Within three months,
however, the Board reversed its position, concluding that Gan-St.
Germain granted it plenary power to interpret the provisions of the
Act and balance "the frequently conflicting interests of lenders and
consumers in those areas which Congress did not expressly address
in the statute." 228 At least in the context of a lender's invoking a
due-on-sale clause, the FHLBB concluded that it had statutory authority to preempt state laws which would have permitted prepayment charges.229
223
224

458 U.S. 141 (1982).
Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified in scattered sections of 12

U.S.C.).
225 Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 170.
226 12 U.S.C. § 1701 j-3. The FHLBB promulgated regulations specifying the extent of preemption of state due-on-sale laws in 1983. 12 C.F.R. § 591.1-.6 (1986).
227 48 Fed. Reg. 21,560 (1983). The FHLBB reached this conclusion in declining, in
the first instance, to prohibit the enforcement of prepayment charges in conjunction
with a lender's exercise of a due-on-sale clause.
228 Preemption of State Due-on-Sale Laws; Imposition of Prepayment Penalties, 48
Fed. Reg. 32,161 (1983). The Board's prepayment analysis is imbued with nineteenthand twentieth-century justifications for prepayment penalties. The Board has recited the
rule of perfect tender in time as true "[a]t common law." The Board has also recognized both the lender's transactions costs in making new loans and discouraging refinancing when market rates fall below contract rates as justifications for prepayment
charges. Preemption of State Due-on-Sale Laws: Imposition of Prepayment Penalties,
49 Fed. Reg. 32,081 (1984).
229 Preemption of State Due-on-Sale Laws; Imposition of Prepayment Penalties, 50
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Though no court has ruled on the precise question, existing
Board prepayment charge regulations governing savings and loan
associations arguably preempt applicable state laws pertaining to
prepayment charges.2 30 With the exceptions of prepayment charges
in the context of due-on-sale clauses 23 1 and disclosure requirements
for prepayment charges, 2 32 the Board's regulations specify that the
existence of a prepayment charge is left to contractual negotiations
between the borrower and lender.2 3 3 In the opinion of the general
counsel of the Board, these provisions permit a federal savings and
loan association and a borrower contractually to agree to prepayment charges notwithstanding any restrictions imposed by state
law.2 34 The argument for preemption is that existing regulations
concerning prepayment charges leave such charges to negotiation
just as earlier regulations left the inclusion of a due-on-sale clause to
the parties. The earlier regulations were found substantively to pre23 5
empt state law under Fidelity Federal.
If the federal government has not already preempted all state
law on mortgage prepayment, the above analysis suggests that such
preemption is likely in the near future. Both the congressional mandate to HUD2 3 6 to propose a standardized mortgage instrument
which contains a prepayment penalty and the wide diversity of recent state restrictions on prepayment charges emphasize the need
for uniformity in mortgage instruments. The market significance of
uniform mortgage instruments was a major reason for federal preemption of due-on-sale clauses; 237 this rationale equally applies to
the problems created by inconsistent mortgage prepayment laws. 238
Fed. Reg. 46,745 (1985). The Board relied on Garn-St. Germain's legislative history to
support its position. The Board concluded that it had "rulemaking authority to provide
additional consumer protections for circumstances where the enforcement of due-onsale would be inequitable." Id.
230
In Toolan v. Trevose Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 501 Pa. 477, 462 A.2d 224 (1983),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that FHLBB prepayment charge regulations preempted state restrictions. The regulations in question were promulgated prior to 1983,
but presumably a similar argument could be made with regard to the current
regulations.
231
See 12 C.F.R. § 545.34(a) (1986).
232
Id. § 545.34(c).
233 Id. § 555.15.
234
Letter from Norman H. Raiden, General Counsel, to the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board (Oct. 9, 1985), reprinted at 50 Fed. Reg. 46,745-6 n.1 (1985).
235
See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
236
See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
237
"Due on sale restrictions ... adversely affect secondary mortgage markets, which
rely on uniform, homogeneous mortgage documents to efficiently operate and provide
mortgage money for lenders and homebuyers." S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
21, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3054, 3075.
238
In testimony before a Senate committee considering the Secondary Mortgage
Market Enhancement Act, the vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve Board stated, "We
have now reached a point where conventional mortgage documents are standardized
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Given the increasing demand for residential mortgage funds and the
secondary mortgage market's need for some form of call protection,
the critical task becomes identifying the appropriate method of
meeting these needs.
Historically, mortgage prepayment issues have never been interpreted solely under conventional contract law analysis. From the
very origins of mortgage law through recent state and federal limitations on prepayment charges, equitable considerations inherent in
property law have entered the analysis in an attempt to balance the
rights of the parties in light of the importance of home ownership to
the debtor. Any prepayment solution must meet the economic
needs of the housing finance market while continuing to reflect the
concerns of equity.
C.

The Future of Mortgage Prepayment: A Simple Solution

The complexity of the mortgage prepayment problem is due in
part to the awkward treatment of prepayment rights in the past centuries. As suggested earlier, prepayment rights have at times been
analyzed primarily under a property law analysis involving equitable
considerations that permitted a debtor to prepay. At other times
the emphasis has been on a purely contractual interpretation of the
rights of the parties. Judicial and legislative restrictions on prepayment penalties expressed or enacted over the course of this century
reflect resistance to the complete transformation of mortgage law
into a subject of contract law. 2 39 The present complexity of mortgage prepayment is further compounded by the economic pressures
of the secondary mortgage market and the possibility of federal preemption. The solution to the problem of mortgage prepayment in
the coming decades lies not in mandating a given result to the question of prepayment charges; it is instead found precisely in those
factors which have made the problem so complex.
The most efficient and at the same time most sensible solution
is to complete the transformation of mortgages into purely financial
investments governed by contract law principles, while simultaneously affirming a residential debtor's right to release his property
from indebtedness upon payment of the debt. This could be accomplished by allowing a debtor to obtain the release upon providing
the creditor with some form of substitute collateral or other assurance that the debt will be paid in accordance with the terms of the
nationally." Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Housing and UrbanAffairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 232 (1983) (statement of Preston Martin, Vice-Chairman, Federal
Reserve System).
239
See supra notes 180-86 and accompanying text.
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promissory note. Such assurance could take the form of either a
written guarantee of payment from a highly rated credit institution
(in which case the debtor would continue to make the scheduled
payments of principal and interest) or the direct assumption of the
payment obligation by such institution (in which case the original
debtor is no longer involved). The basic premise of this solution
reflects mortgage law principles from the fifteenth to early nineteenth centuries: the existence of the debt is the primary feature of
these relationships and the real property security is secondary to the
debt. In the event that a debtor presents a creditor with adequate
substitute security for the debt, the creditor would be required to
2 40
release the encumbrance on the debtor's property.
This solution can be accomplished through a rule which specifies that if a creditor refuses prepayment then, upon provision of
adequate security, 2 4 1 the debtor would have the right to have the

mortgage released from the property. This right would constitute a
status rather than a contract right. It would be a reaffirmation of the
equity of redemption during the pre-default period of a loan, and
would not be subject to contractual modification or waiver.2 4 2 Any
240 This solution is consistent with the subtle, yet highly significant, shift in the
FHLBB's recent analysis. The Board suggested, "The implicit premise of the [proposed
regulation] is that the benefit of the bargain for the lender is to have a creditworthy
borrower obligated on the loan for its stated term to maturity." 50 Fed. Reg. 46,746
(1985). This "benefit of the bargain" approach is consistent with dicta expressed in
Mahoney v. Furches, 309 Pa. Super. 129,454 A.2d 1117, rev'd, 503 Pa. 60, 468 A.2d 458
(1983):
[I]t would be neither practical nor equitable and, in fact, would be a violation of public policy as a restraint upon alienation, if we were to preclude
the satisfaction of this mortgage once the mortgagor has provided for a
method of prepayment that enables the mortgagee to reap all the benefits
of the bargain ....
Id. at 136, 454 A.2d at 1120. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted this view with
approval. Mahoney v. Furches, 503 Pa. 60, 66 n.l, 468 A.2d 458, 461 n.1 (1983).
241 Determining what constitutes "adequate security" will not be an easy task under
this "simple" solution. This is not an insurmountable obstacle, however, because the
market could develop ratings for credit institutions and entities that guarantee or assume debt obligations similar to the ratings that presently exist for security instruments.
242 Commenting on Fidelity Federal and other cases involving judicial invalidation of
voluntary contractual provisions, Haddock and Hall argue that when a right is made
inalienable, as in the solution I propose, market inefficiencies result and parties who
might enter into similar relationships in the future are discouraged. Haddock & Hall,
The Impact of Making Rights Inalienable: Menion v. JicarillaApache Tribe, Tecaco, Inc. v. Short,
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, and Ridgway v. Ridgway, 2 Sup. CT.
ECON. REV. 1 (1983). To the extent that this argument is based on the retroactive invalidation of contract provisions, I concur. My solution could easily be styled so as to have
only prospective effect. To the extent that Haddock and Hall argue that the existence of
inalienable contract rights themselves create market inefficiencies, I accept this as a valid
criticism of my proposal. I suggest, however, that my proposal creates less inefficiency
than any alternative method of meeting both legislative demand for residential debtor
protection and the pressure exerted by the secondary mortgage market for uniform instruments and call protection.
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substantive restriction on this right would be treated much as any
"clog on the equity of redemption" has been regarded since the
early eighteenth century.
This solution has numerous advantages and few evident disadvantages. Perhaps its most significant advantage is that this solution
neither prohibits nor mandates prepayment charges. Thus, the parties' freedom of negotiation in this area would result in the determination of prepayment charges and conditions within a framework of
market needs and competition. 243 The simple fact that the debtor
could, upon the creditor's refusal to accept prepayment, transfer his
debt obligation to the commercial market would have a significant
impact on prepayment charges and eliminate many of the inequitable results which presently arise. Regardless of the amount of the
prepayment charge specified in the loan documents, market pressures would effectively limit the amount of the charge actually
levied.
For example, if a debtor has a $100,000 thirty-year fixed-rate
mortgage at twelve percent (with monthly payments of principal and
interest of approximately $1,028.62) and prevailing interest rates
are at ten percent, prepayment of the indebtedness is to the debtor's
advantage and the creditor's corresponding disadvantage. The
creditor would either refuse prepayment or insist on a prepayment
charge on the ground that prepayment denies him his anticipated
yield over time. If the promissory note is silent on prepayment, the
rule of perfect tender in time controls and the creditor could, depending on the jurisdiction, insist on a charge of $3,000, $10,000,
or even $50,000. To the extent, however, that the creditor insists
on a charge in excess of the discounted present value of the difference between a twelve percent rate and a ten percent rate over the
remaining life of the loan, the debtor could "purchase" an annuity
which would provide the creditor with the expected monthly income
stream of $1,028.62. The debtor would, of course, have to pay a
premium to the provider of the annuity beyond the loan's outstanding principal balance. That premium would be no greater than the
243 A variation on this proposal was presented to the court in In re N.S. Garrott &
Sons, 772 F.2d 462 (8th Cir. 1985). In Garrotta debtor sought to refinance two existing
mortgages which contained prepayment penalties. By depositing an amount slightly in
excess of the total outstanding balance on the existing mortgages with a title insurance
company, the debtor was able to obtain a title policy which did not reflect the existing
mortgages as encumbrances. The title company acted as escrow agent in making scheduled payments on the mortgages from the funds deposited into escrow. Though the
lawfulness of this procedure was not at issue in the litigation, the court did consider it "a
very questionable scheme" based upon "a commitment for title insurance which debtors
knew to contain false information." Id. at 466.
The proposal set forth in this article would permit similar financial alternatives without presenting the question of accuracy of title commitment disclosures.
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discounted present value of the difference between the contract rate
of interest and the market rate of interest plus an amount representing the provider's profit. The debtor could obtain the funds to
purchase this annuity either from the sale of the property or from
the refinancing proceeds.
Conversely, if the contract rate is only eight percent and the
prevailing market rate is ten percent, presumably the creditor would
be happy to receive prepayment in order to reinvest the funds at the
higher rate. If, however, the creditor refuses to accept prepayment,
either because the creditor simply prefers the predictable income
stream or because the promissory note provides for a significant
prepayment charge, the debtor could release his property from the
mortgage by purchasing the annuity at a discount reflecting the
lower prevailing rates of interest. The debtor would obtain the benefit of this discount only because the creditor refused to accept
prepayment.
In each of these situations the creditor could waive or reduce
the contractually specified prepayment charge. Indeed, the possibility of the debtor's transferring the debt obligation to a third party
would likely be sufficient incentive for the creditor to renegotiate
the prepayment charge to a level which more accurately reflects the
costs or benefits of prepayment of the debt. This proposal would
not impose any limitations on initial negotiations between the
debtor and creditor concerning a prepayment charge, nor would the
proposal necessitate any particularized inquiry into the motivations
or expectations of a given creditor or debtor. To the contrary, my
suggestion would maximize the flexibility of the parties' economic
goals, subjecting them only to overall market conditions. Creditors
would still receive the benefit of a drop in market interest rates
when they have loaned money initially at a higher rate; the proposal
would simply create a market limitation to the economic value of
this benefit. If a creditor for some reason wished to avoid prepayment regardless of changes in interest rates and instead desired the
stability of a regular income stream over time, the debtor could
meet these needs without adverse effect on the creditor.
This proposed solution has the additional advantage of meeting
the needs of the secondary mortgage market with minimum substantive legislative or regulatory intervention. The proposal provides call protection against early prepayment of mortgage debt
because creditors would presumably insist on a prepayment charge
in the loan documents. The amount of the charge effectively paid
(either directly by the debtor to the creditor, or indirectly to a third
party) would reflect the market interest rates. Investors in mortgage-backed securities would be assured that this market determina-
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tion of the value of the interest rate differential would accompany
any prepayment of principal. The present difficulties in developing
accurate models for prepayment rates would become moot in light
of this change. The secondary mortgage market's need for uniformity in underlying pooled mortgages would not be met through a
standard form promulgated by the FHLBB containing mandatory
terms and conditions for prepayment charges. Rather, the uniformity would exist because the yield of the mortgages would be common as to any given interest rate in the mortgage pool. 24 4 In
addition, this proposal alleviates the difficulties faced by individual
residential borrowers forced to make extremely complex projections
of future mortgage rates in order to negotiate proper prepayment
charges. The calculations would be made by sophisticated credit institutions, which could simply quote to the debtor the cost of having
the institution assume the debt.
Federal preemption of inconsistent state laws could effectively
implement this solution. Although the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board's authority to preempt state laws on this issue is unclear,
Congress could elect to preempt such state laws to the extent necessary. The preemption would be in the form of regulations specifying that a creditor of a residential mortgage is required either to
accept prepayment or to release the real property from the mortgage upon receiving adequate substitute collateral for the debt in
the form of a guarantee or direct assumption of the debt from a
credit-worthy institution or entity. The regulations could either define "credit-worthiness" or could leave it to the creditor's reasonable determination.
This proposal would neither adversely affect the existing status
of due-on-sale clauses nor impair their function for creditors. Mortgages could still contain due-on-sale clauses effectively preventing a
purchaser from assuming (without the creditor's consent) an existing mortgage with a below-market interest rate. To the extent
that creditors rely upon due-on-sale clauses to retire mortgages with
below-market interest rates, they can continue to do so. Because
the proposal requires that a debtor offer prepayment to the creditor
before exercising the right to provide substitute collateral, it prevents debtors from circumventing due-on-sale clauses by purchasing substitute collateral at a discount and then selling the property.
Creditors could still provide for prepayment penalties in the loan
244 This proposal does not address the predictive difficulties posed by early termination of mortgages due to debtor default. These difficulties could, however, be addressed through private residential mortgage insurance which is currently available. If
this problem remains significant for investors in the secondary market, it may be necessary to rely more heavily on mortgage payment guarantees instead of insurance.
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documents and thereby benefit in periods of falling interest rates to
the extent of the market's determination of the economic value of
the interest rate differential.
CONCLUSION

Mortgage prepayment is a concern to residential homeowners
across the country. Present laws governing the right of a homeowner to prepay and the right of a creditor to insist upon a prepayment fee or charge vary tremendously from state to state. Recent
widespread demand for residential finance, coupled with significant
interest rate fluctuations and the emergence of the private secondary mortgage market, have created pressure for uniformity and
predictability in mortgage finance. Significant changes in the law of
mortgage prepayment are likely to occur within the next few years.
The current task is to shape these new developments in a coherent
manner that responds to the needs of debtors and creditors alike. A
thorough understanding of the historical development of mortgage
prepayment law assists in shaping properly the future of mortgage
prepayment.
A dominant theme in the history of mortgage prepayment law
has been the tension between the application of equitable principles
of property law and the rigid application of contract law. From the
fourteenth through the eighteenth centuries, equity courts played a
major role in protecting a debtor's right to obtain a release of a
mortgage upon payment of the debt. No clear rule restricted or
prohibited prepayment of a debt without the creditor's consent. Instead, equity courts placed the emphasis on the debt itself; the property merely provided security for payment of the debt. Timing of
the debt's payment was of little consequence so long as the debt was
paid by the date specified.
The rule of perfect tender in time, which prohibited prepayment without consent of the creditor, first emerged in the early
nineteenth century. Adopted throughout the United States, this
rule was interpreted and applied with the full rigor of contract formalism. Twentieth-century courts and legislatures have attempted
to mitigate the harshness of the rule by placing limitations on prepayment charges and stretching vague language in the loan documents to find a right of prepayment. The recurring tension between
property and contract law demonstrates that the residential mortgagor has something more at stake than simply a financial investment.
The gradual shift towards the commercialization of mortgages
presents a second theme in the history of mortgage law. Beginning
in the early nineteenth century, creditors viewed mortgages primarily as financial investments. Prior to that time mortgages were cer-
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tainly investments, but they were investments made in the context of
on-going personal relationships between debtors and creditors. For
the past one hundred and fifty years, however, mortgages have been
freely transferred among creditors as investments. Today the overwhelming majority of mortgages become commercial paper which is
securitized on the secondary mortgage market. Debtors, however,
have not yet achieved the same degree of commercial flexibility in
transferring their debt obligations to third parties.
A third theme which runs throughout mortgage prepayment
law is the philosophical reliance on reciprocity to justify the legal
rules. These concepts have themselves undergone subtle yet significant transformation over the centuries from emphasizing reciprocity
of remedies to emphasizing that if a creditor could not demand payment at will, a debtor could not pay the debt at will. For the past
century, however, the concept of reciprocity has rarely been applied
consistently.
The historical development of prepayment law provides insights to a solution to the present challenges facing mortgage prepayment. The solution is radical for its simplicity, yet it is grounded
in common sense. The solution recognizes the debtor's right to
compel release of the mortgage upon provision of adequate substitute collateral if the creditor refuses to accept prepayment. The
substitute collateral could take the form of a guarantee or of a direct
assumption of the debt by a third party.
Simple solutions are rarely adequate for complex problems, but
in this case I think it works. First, by recognizing the debtor's unwaivable status-based right to clear his property of a mortgage upon
provision of substitute collateral, the proposal affirms a consideration long recognized in equity-the debtor's interest in the property
frequently goes beyond that of simply a financial investment. Second, by treating the debt as a secured transaction, the proposal
completes the transformation of mortgage indebtedness from a
property concept to a contract concept.
The proposed solution allows the debtor, as well as the creditor, to commercialize the debt: it allows the debtor to place the
mortgage on the same purely economic foundations as does the
creditor. Thus, in circumstances involving either condemnation
awards or casualty insurance proceeds, the debtor could use the
funds to purchase the agreement of a third party to pay the debt in
the expected manner. The original debtor and creditor may negotiate a prepayment charge in these circumstances, but the debtor
could either pay the charge or put the debt obligation on the market
so as to release the property from the mortgage and then refinance,
if desirable.
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This proposed solution is consistent with the philosophical concepts of reciprocity as they have developed over the centuries. The
prenineteenth-century formula of reciprocity was that a creditor has
a right to take the property if the debt was not paid and the debtor
had a right to have the property freed of the mortgage if the debt
was paid. The nineteenth- and twentieth-century formula of reciprocity has been that if the creditor cannot demand payment at will,
the debtor cannot pay at will. My solution combines and reconciles
these formulas: if the creditor cannot demand payment at will, the
debtor cannot prepay at will, but the debtor does have the right to
have the property freed of the mortgage if a third party guarantees
the debt.
The proposal further allows individual debtors and creditors to
negotiate freely prepayment charges, but subjects them to limits on
the effective costs of mortgage prepayments established by the financial markets. It meets the needs of the residential finance market
with minimum interference with the market, and at the same time it
recognizes that, to the homeowner, the home is not merely security
for a debt.

